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LEGAL INNOCENCE AND FEDERAL HABEAS
Leah M Litman*
Although it has long been thought that innocence should matter in
federal habeas corpus proceedings, innocence scholarship has
focused almost exclusively on claims offactual innocence-the kind of
innocence that occurs when new evidence reveals that the defendant
did not commit the offense for which he was convicted. The literature
has largely overlooked cases where a defendant was convicted or
sentenced under a statute that is unconstitutional, or a statute that
does not apply to the defendant. The Supreme Court, however, has
recently begun to recognize these cases as kinds of innocence and it
has grounded its concern for them in innocence-related
considerations. This Article highlights how the doctrine has started to
treat these "legal innocence" cases as cases in which defendants are
innocent, as well as the reasons why it has done so. As this Article
explains, legal innocence is conceptually and inextricably linked with
factual innocence; in both kinds of cases, the defendant was convicted
or sentenced under a law she did not violate. These cases raise similar
concerns and implicate many of the same features of our criminal law
system. By recognizing the emerging category of legal innocence as a
kind of innocence, this Article maps out how the existing federal
habeas system can provide relief to legally innocent defendants.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 418
I. THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF INNOCENCE ..................... 423
A. Innocence Reform.................................424
B. The Law ofInnocence...............................428
1. Gateways & Bypasses....... .................... 428
2. Merits................... .................... 431
II. LEGAL INNOCENCE AS INNOCENCE ........................... 436
A. Recognizing Legal Innocence............ ............ 438
1. Statutory Interpretation..........................438
a. Offenses .......................... ............ 438
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. Thanks to
Erwin Chemnerinsky, Daniel Deacon, Eve Primus, and Steve Viadeck for helpful comments
and feedback, as well as the editors of the Virginia Law Review, particularly Jay Swanson,
Caroline Kessler, and Samneera Ripley.
417
418 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:417
b. Sentences ............................ ..... 439
2. Statutory Invalidation........................... 442
a. Constitutional Immunities ................ ..... 442
b. Constitutional Means .... ..................... 444
B. The New Innocence? .......................... ..... 447
1. Conceptual Overlap. ....................... ..... 448
2. Theories ofPunishment .................... ...... 450
C. Resistance to Innocence ....................... ..... 453
1. Relitigation & Factual Innocence ............ ...... 454
2. Sentence Versus Offense .................... ..... 460
3. Reform Advantages. ....................... ...... 462
III. REALIZING LEGAL INNOCENCE ........................... ..... 464
A. "Procedure ": Gateways & Bypasses .............. ..... 466
1. Procedural Default ....................... ...... 466
a. Balancing the Interests .................. ..... 466
b. Doctrinal Signals. ....................... ..... 468
c. Implementation ....................... ...... 473
2. Statute ofLimitations ....................... ..... 474
3. Exhaustion .............................. ..... 476
4. Evidentiary Hearings........................... 480
5. Successive Petitions........................................................... 481
a. (Re)interpreting Sections 2244 and 2255.......... 483
b. Interpreting section 2255(e).................... 485
c. Extraordinary Writs.......................... 489
B. Merits & Freestanding Claims....................... 491
1. C ognizability ...................................................................... 491
2. AEDPA D eference............................................................. 493
C ON CLU SION ............................................................................... ....... 495
INTRODUCTION
It has long been thought that innocence should matter in federal
habeas corpus. Ever since an influential article by Judge Henry Friendly
proposed that federal habeas courts should review all colorable claims of
innocence,' scholars and courts have continued to press for innocence to
1 See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160-64 (1970).
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matter in federal habeas.2 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn
on innocence-oriented accounts of habeas to exempt innocent defendants
from a variety of the procedural barriers that habeas petitioners face.
But courts and scholars have embraced different kinds of innocence in
their proposals to make federal habeas more attentive to innocence.
Scholarship has primarily focused on claims of factual innocence which
occurs when new evidence reveals that the defendant did not commit the
offense he was convicted of (the offense of conviction). Doctrine,
however, has become increasingly attentive to claims of legal
innocence, which arise when no valid criminal statute prohibited the
defendant's conduct or supplied the basis for the defendant's sentence.'
What is striking about the disconnect between the scholarship and the
2 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1630-37 (2008);
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change
1, 3, 35-39 (2016); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Innocence and Federal Habeas after the AEDPA:
Time for the Supreme Court to Act, 24 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 300, 304 (2012); Jordan M. Steiker,
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 384 (1993); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus
on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 587,
609-17 (2005).
3 See David M. Dorsen, Henry Friendly: Greatest Judge of His Era 219 (2012) ("As if in
answer to Judge Friendly's original query .. . the Court shift[ed] the pith of the habeas
inquiry from procedural demands for fairness to substantive claims of innocence. "(alteration
in original)(citation omitted)); Jake Sussman, Note, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an
"Actual Innocence" Exception to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 343, 378 (2001) ("Innocence is now unquestionably relevant to federal habeas
corpus review."); see also, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386-87 (2013) (actual
innocence exception to statute of limitations); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96
(1986) (actual innocence exception to procedural default). {Master: spacing}
4 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century:
Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ 91 (2011) [hereinafter King & Hoffman,
Habeas for the Twenty-First Century]; Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 304 ("clear and
convincing new evidence" (citation omitted)); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89
N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1084-85 (2011) (noting scholarship has "focus[ed] attention on people
who were not involved in the crime for which they were convicted"); John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus,
57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 691 (1990) (arguing for "factual innocence" to matter in federal
habeas); Steiker, supra note 2, at 386 (1993) ("colorable showing of factual innocence").
5 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (holding that a petitioner
can argue in federal habeas that he could not constitutionally be subject to a non-capital
sentence and invoking Friendly, supra note 1, at 151); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1257, 1261, 1265 (2016) (explaining why considerations of innocence matter when a
defendant is sentenced under a statute that does not apply to him); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 616, 620-21 (1998) (equating petitioner who may have been convicted of
conduct the law did not make criminal with an "innocent" defendant).
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doctrine in this area is that the two kinds of innocence are conceptually
similar and overlap in important ways-in both cases, the defendant is
"innocent" because she did not commit an act the law makes criminal. In
factual innocence cases, that is because a factfinder erred in determining
what the defendant did; in legal innocence cases, it is because there was
an error as to what the criminal law did, or could, prohibit. Although the
result in both cases is the same, the scholarly calls to make federal
habeas more amenable to claims of innocence have primarily focused on
cases of factual innocence.
This Article highlights how the doctrine has started to treat certain
categories of legal innocence as instances where a defendant is innocent
of a crime, as well as the conceptual overlap between legal and factual
innocence. The Court has recently approached some cases of legal
innocence in the same way it would approach cases of factual innocence.
That is, the Court treats the "innocence" designation as if it includes
both factually and legally innocent defendants, including cases in which
a defendant was convicted or sentenced under a statute that either did
not apply to him, or a statute that was unconstitutional. The doctrine's
reception to legal innocence is noteworthy because it runs against the
general trend of judges narrowing the scope of federal habeas review.
Beyond merely noting rhetorical signals in the doctrine, this Article also
defends the doctrine's broader conception of innocence that
encompasses both factual innocence and legal innocence. Treating some
kinds of legal innocence as cases in which the defendant is innocent
makes sense given that the two kinds of innocence lie along a continuum
of the relevant substantive goals of priminal law and punishment, as well
as the structure of our criminal law system.
6 This Article differs from other scholars' proposals to expand the kinds of innocence that
might matter in federal habeas. Some have argued that because criminal procedure rights like
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments also protect the guilty, a defendant may be legally
innocent, and thus actually innocent, if his conviction was obtained in violation of a criminal
procedure right. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 4, at 1090 (describing as "actually innocent"
people who "have strong constitutional claims that warrant the reversal of
their ... convictions"). Others argue that a defendant should be considered innocent if he
makes a lesser showing of factual innocence than is required under current doctrine. See,
e.g., Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1157, 1157-62 (2011)
(innocence should not demand certainty). This Article does not wade into what burden of
proof might be required to establish innocence, or address whether innocence claims should
be available to those who can be retried or resentenced under the same statute they were
convicted or sentenced under in the initial proceeding.
420 [Vol. 104:417
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Legal innocence cases also represent rare, and welcome, judicial
regard for the importance of noncapital penalties in criminal procedure
and law. Criminal procedure doctrine has, thus far, avoided meaningful
judicial scrutiny of the severity of noncapital criminal sentences. But
recent legal innocence cases have recognized the importance of
sentencing distinctions and graduated penalties by proclaiming that
defendants may be innocent of their sentence, including term-of-year
sentences that were mistakenly imposed on them.' Reinforcing the claim
that a defendant may be innocent of a noncapital sentence might provide
some basis for a more robust review of noncapital sentences in the
future.
Revealing how and why the doctrine treats some kinds of legal
innocence as actual innocence accomplishes several things. First, it
provides a roadmap for legally innocent defendants to overcome several
of the restrictions on federal habeas review. While existing doctrine
allows innocent defendants to bypass many procedural barriers to
federal habeas review, the doctrine also proclaims, at times, that these
bypasses are only available to defendants who are actually (factually)
innocent. The Court's recent cases, however, have treated some kinds of
legal innocence as actual innocence, underscoring that actual innocence,
properly understood, encompasses both factual and legal innocence.
Moreover, the procedural contexts in which the Court has treated legal
innocence as a species of actual innocence protect similar concerns and
interests as the procedural areas of habeas in which the Court has not yet
taken this approach. The doctrine has therefore already suggested that
the interest in affording federal habeas relief to legally innocent
defendants outweighs the relevant interests furthered by other procedural
restrictions on federal habeas. Furthermore, understanding legal
innocence as a species of actual innocence allows legally innocent
defendants to avail themselves of the existing exceptions to procedural
restrictions for cases of innocence. This approach also makes the current
federal post-conviction system fairer even without a legislative fix.
7 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1146
(2009) ("The Court will scrutinize whether the death sentence is proportionate to the crime
and the defendant .... In noncapital cases, in contrast, the Court has done virtually nothing
to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.").
8 See supra note 5.
2018] 421
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Second, the category of legal innocence does not necessarily
implicate many of the criticisms of the current federal habeas system
and the concerns with litigating factual innocence claims in federal
habeas. Many of the proposals to make federal habeas about innocence
originated as ways to limit the ability of defendants to relitigate Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments claims after a trial and an appeal. If
successful, these claims would allow defendants to obtain new trials to
redetermine their guilt.9 Legal innocence claims are different. Successful
legal innocence claims would not result in a retrial either because the
statute under which the defendant was convicted did not prohibit his
conduct, or because the statute under which the defendant was convicted
is unconstitutional. The defendant also could not be retried under a
subsequently enacted, constitutional statute because the constitutional
protection against ex post facto laws would bar the government from
prosecuting the defendant under that statute. The same would be true if
the defendant was legally innocent of his sentence and received a
sentence that exceeded the lawful statutory maximum-any subsequent
resentencing proceeding would not merely redo the original proceeding,
either because the statute under which the defendant was sentenced does
not apply to him, or because it is invalid. Moreover, litigating legal
innocence claims can be less burdensome than litigating factual
innocence claims. Legal innocence claims involve challenges to the
validity of the statute under which the defendant was convicted or
sentenced, not efforts to redetermine prior facts. While some legal
innocence challenges may generate assessments as to whether the
defendant's conduct, as established at trial or admitted to in a plea
agreement, was prohibited or penalized by a criminal statute, those cases
do not necessarily require redetermining the facts or collecting new
9 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 1, at 155-56 (explaining that "[t]he dimensions of the
problem of collateral attack today are a consequence of... the Supreme Court's imposition
of the rules of the fourth, fifth, [and] sixth ... amendments ... concerning unreasonable
searches and seizures, double jeopardy, speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, jury trial
in criminal cases, confrontation of adverse witnesses, [and] assistance of counsel ... upon
state criminal trials"); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 517 (1963) (explaining difficult "retrial[s]" that
might result from successful habeas petition). The Court has likewise raised concerns with
relitigating a defendant's guilt on retrial. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403, 417
(1993) (worrying that "the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal
adjudications," and about "the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often
stale evidence would place on the States").
422 [Vol. 104:417
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evidence, nor do they involve other burdens associated with litigating
factual innocence claims.
Third, conceptualizing legal innocence claims as claims of innocence
reveals some of the flaws in the existing critiques that push back on the
idea that federal habeas should be more attentive to claims of innocence.
Not all claims of innocence, including claims of factual innocence, will
require relitigation, and not all claims of innocence will undermine
criminal law's force. Finally, this Article also shows how current
understandings of innocence may be flawed: factual and legal innocence
lie on a continuum that does not lend itself to firm separation.
This Article argues that in light of the conceptual similarities between
legal innocence and factual innocence, as well as the distinctions
between legal innocence claims and the claims on which existing habeas
law is premised, habeas relief can and should be made available to
legally innocent defendants. Part I outlines the scholarly and judicial
tradition of innocence in habeas law, which recognizes that innocence
can function either as a gateway that allows a defendant to bypass
procedural obstacles or as a freestanding claim that warrants habeas
relief.' 0 Part II defends the doctrine's suggestion that legal innocence
cases are properly treated similarly to factual innocence cases in light of
the purposes of substantive criminal law, the structure of our lawmaking
system, and the policies that purportedly animate federal habeas
doctrine. It also argues that the restrictions on federal habeas, and even
the concerns with litigating factual innocence claims, do not apply with
equal force to legal innocence claims. Part III outlines how current law
can make federal habeas available to legally innocent defendants.
I. THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF INNOCENCE
Courts and scholars have long been drawn to conceptions of federal
habeas that prioritize innocence. Even after Congress restructured
federal habeas with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA")," much of the law of federal habeas remains related to
10 "Gateway" and "freestanding" are the terms typically used to describe the two different
functions. Innocence serves as a "gateway" when it allows defendants to bypass procedural
restrictions. Innocence serves as a "freestanding" claim when it warrants issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95
Cornell L. Rev. 329, 332 (2010).
" Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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innocence. But what is innocence? When scholars have called for
innocence to matter in federal habeas, they have focused primarily on
factual innocence, at least outside the context of capital cases. But these
cases are not limited to factual innocence, and the courts have suggested
in recent years that legal innocence also matters to federal habeas.
A. Innocence Reform
Some of the scholarly calls for innocence-oriented accounts of federal
habeas originated in response to Brown v. Allen. 12 Brown announced that
prisoners convicted in state court could relitigate their federal
constitutional claims in federal habeas proceedings. 3 The decision drew
sharp dissents, 14 including one from Justice Jackson that bemoaned how
petitions for habeas corpus-all of the 3,702 petitions filed in the seven
years before Brown-would inundate the federal courts and prejudice
meritorious petitions." Scholars raised additional criticisms of Brown's
model of relitigation. Professor Paul Bator offered one of the most
prominent critiques, in which he argued that collateral attacks on
criminal judgments undermine criminal law's deterrent and reha-
bilitative purposes;16 lead to unreliable factual and legal determinations
because federal habeas occurs so long after the relevant events (and any
subsequent trial ordered as a result of federal habeas occurs even later);' 7
and undermine society's interest in repose." Bator also argued that
relitigation should not be used to correct errors because it is impossible
to know with certainty what facts occurred in the past; nor is it possible
12 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
13 Id. at 458 (explaining that prior state court adjudication is not res judicata); id. at 497-
513 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explaining bases for relitigation).
14 Id. at 532-38 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (arguing against relitigation).
15 Id. at 537 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result); see id. at 498 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citing statistics about the number of petitions). Recent estimates indicate that
the figure is much higher, with over 15,000 petitions filed by state court prisoners, and
approximately 6,000 petitions filed by federal prisoners in 2007. King & Hoffman, Habeas
for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 4, at 60, 116.
16 Bator, supra note 9, at 452.
17 See id. at 446-47, 515-16.
" See id. at 452.
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to know the correct legal rule or the correct application of a rule to the
facts.19
Echoing many of the same criticisms,20 Judge Henry Friendly
proposed a solution.21 Friendly argued that while federal collateral
review of criminal judgments should generally allow for relitigation in
certain narrow circumstances,22 it should also be available where a
defendant makes a "colorable showing[] of innocence,"2 3 meaning there
is
a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that
alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly
excluded or to have become available only after trial, the trier of the
facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt. 24
Under Friendly's model, federal courts would ascertain if "an error,
whether 'constitutional' or not," was "producing the continued punish-
ment of an innocent man." 25
Scholars have continued to press for innocence-oriented accounts of
federal habeas. Most of these calls for innocence-focused federal habeas
have, like Friendly's, focused on factual claims of innocence where
evidence shows that the defendant was not guilty of the crime he was
convicted of. For example, Professors Bill Stuntz and John Jeffries
maintained that federal habeas review should only be available for
claims not raised in state proceedings where "consideration of
[the] . . . claim would present a realistic possibility of correcting an
19 See id. at 446-48. Bator also argued Brown's relitigation model was inconsistent with
the history of federal habeas. See id. at 463-99.
20 See Friendly, supra note 1, at 146-49.
21 Bator proposed that federal relitigation should be available only where the state did not
provide a full and fair process to litigate the constitutional claim or the prior court lacked
jurisdiction. Bator, supra note 9, at 462.
22 These included: (1) the initial court lacked "jurisdiction"; (2) claims premised on facts
outside the record; (3) claims for which the state failed to provide an adequate procedure for
their litigation; and (4) new constitutional rules that are fully retroactive. Friendly, supra note
1, at 151-53.
23 Id. at 157.
24 Id. at 160 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. (footnote omitted); see id. at 167 (proposing same for state prisoners); id. at 143
(proposing legislation for state prisoners).
2018] 425
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unjust conviction or sentence of death." 2 6 Stuntz and Jeffries defined an
unjust conviction or sentence to include cases where the defendant did
not commit the charged crime27 as well as any claim "concerning the
sentencing stage of capital proceedings."2 8 Professors Joseph Hoffmann
and Bill Stuntz offered another innocence-focused proposal 29 which
imagined two "tracks" for federal habeas-one track made federal
habeas available where it was necessary to deter constitutional
violations, while the other was meant to prevent "the unjust punishment
of innocent defendants."o Under Hoffinan and Stuntz's model, "any
defendant could obtain habeas review of the constitutionality of his
conviction by (1) demonstrating a 'reasonable probability' that he is
innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and (2) alleging a
constitutional violation that resulted in his erroneous conviction."3 1
Hoffinan and Stuntz's proposed innocence track also involved
consideration of unjust capital sentences, 3 2 and "would not preclude
habeas relief even for a 'naked' innocence claim" that did not allege any
independent constitutional violation.3 3
One of the more full-throated calls for an innocence-oriented federal
habeas occurred on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in
Herrera v. Collins.34 In Herrera, the Court opted not to decide whether
the Constitution prohibited the execution of a person who had not
committed the crime for which he was sentenced to death.35 After
Herrera, Professor Jordan Steiker argued that federal habeas review
should be available for claims of innocence, whether or not a
26 Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 680.
27 Id. at 691. They defined this as "factual innocence," and underscored that their "focus is
on factual innocence." Id.
28 Id. at 720. They explain: "[T]he statutory and constitutional criteria governing the death
sentence involve irreducible elements of subjectivity and discretion" and so "the concept of
factual reliability loses its clarity and hardness." Id. at 720-21.
29 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 65, 65-66.
30 Id. at 85-86, 95.
31 Id. at 95.
32 See id. at 119-22.
13 Id. at 97.
34 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
1 Id. at 405.
426 [Vol. 104:417
Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas
freestanding claim of innocence amounted to a constitutional violation.36
Steiker adopted Friendly's standard and proposed that a petitioner would
need to make a "colorable showing of factual innocence," considering
all of the evidence, including any excluded evidence, in order to obtain
federal habeas review of an innocence claim.3 7 Steiker concluded that to
obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner would need to show "by a
preponderance of the evidence . .. that it is more likely than not that he
did not commit the crime.
Even after Congress enacted the AEDPA, which imposed
considerable restrictions on federal habeas, the calls for innocence
persisted. Hoffmann renewed Steiker's proposal for bare factual
innocence claims to be reviewable in federal habeas, but argued that, in
light of the AEDPA, the Supreme Court would have to hold that the
conviction of an innocent person amounted to a constitutional
violation.3 9 Hoffmann argued that in order to establish a constitutional
violation, the defendant must show "by clear and convincing new
evidence, not previously discoverable through the exercise of due
diligence, that in light of the evidence as a whole, no reasonable
factfinder would have found him guilty of the underlying offense." 4 0
Hoffmann and Professor Nancy King proposed this same standard for
innocence claims when they recommended a legislative overhaul of
federal habeas review of state convictions.4'
These proposals, for the most part, focus on claims of factual
innocence. Either explicitly or implicitly, the proposals' suggested
standard for the availability of habeas is designed to ferret out when new
(or existing) facts establish that a defendant is not guilty of the offense,
or did not commit the act that made him eligible for a capital sentence.4 2
36 Steiker, supra note 2, at 303 (1993). Steiker argued that because so much of federal
habeas was federal common law, the Court could announce, as a matter of federal common
law, that defendants could obtain review of their factual innocence claims.
1 Id. at 386-87 (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 387 (footnote omitted).
3 Hoffinann, supra note 2, at 304-05.
40 King & Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 4, at 91-92.
41 Id.; see also Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 819 (2009) [hereinafter Hoffman & King,
Rethinking the Federal Role]




A more recent proposal for an innocence-oriented account of federal
habeas argued for federal habeas to extend to one particular kind of legal
innocence: "death ineligibility" claims. 43 Death ineligibility claims are
claims that "if successful . . . would categorically bar a capital sentence,"
like the constitutional rules that prohibit imposing capital sentences on
certain subsets of offenders like juveniles, individuals with limited
mental capacity, or persons convicted of rape or felony murder.4 By
urging federal courts to treat death ineligibility claims as innocence
claims, Professor Lee Kovarsky sought to have federal courts review
procedurally defaulted death ineligibility claims as well as death
ineligibility claims presented in second, successive, or untimely petitions
for federal habeas. 45 But Kovarsky's proposal was solely concerned with
the kind of legal innocence cases where the Constitution bars the
defendant's sentence, and only then in cases involving capital sentences.
B. The Law ofInnocence
Scholars are not alone in being drawn to innocence-oriented accounts
of federal habeas. Before Congress enacted the AEDPA, federal judges
incorporated innocence into several features of the law surrounding
federal habeas. Several of the AEDPA's restrictions even incorporate
innocence considerations, and judges have continued to include
innocence in additional features of the law surrounding federal habeas
post-AEDPA.
1. Gateways & Bypasses
Procedural Default. Procedural default is a judge-made doctrine that
generally bars federal courts from considering claims that were not
previously adjudicated because they were not raised in accordance with
a procedural rule.46 Murray v. Carrier held that a federal habeas court
may entertain procedurally defaulted claims to prevent a "fundamental
43 Kovarsky, supra note 10, at 332-33.
4 See id. at 331-32, 349-55.
45 See id. at 378-89.
" See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 13 (2012) (describing procedural default
doctrines as rules "elaborated in the exercise of the Court's discretion"). The default must
rest on an adequate and independent state ground, and a defendant can obtain review by
showing cause and prejudice. E.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1989)
(summarizing the doctrine).
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miscarriage of justice,"47 which it defined as instances where a
defendant has established there has "probably" been "[a] conviction of
one who is actually innocent." 48
Murray spoke in terms of the conviction of an innocent person, but
subsequent cases expanded the miscarriage of justice exception to
include persons who are innocent of their capital sentences. Sawyer v.
Whitley set the standard for a defendant to establish her innocence of her
capital sentence, which the Court defined to mean that a defendant was
guilty of a crime, but not subject to the death penalty. 4 9 The Eighth
Amendment requires states to "define death-eligible crimes" by
"provid[ing] a finite list of specific aggravating factors," that is,
prerequisites for the imposition of the death penalty that juries must find
before imposing a capital sentence. 0 Sawyer held that a defendant may
establish she is actually innocent of a capital sentence, and thus have her
procedurally defaulted claim heard on the merits, if the defendant shows
by "clear and convincing evidence"" that a trier of fact could have
entertained a reasonable doubt about "facts which are prerequisites
under state or federal law for the imposition of the death penalty."52
Statute of Limitations. The AEDPA established a one-year statute of
limitations that runs from one of four dates,53 and the Court has held that
the statute of limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons.5 4 The Court
has also held that the statute of limitations may be excused for "a
convincing showing of actual innocence," meaning that the petitioner
has "persuade[d] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no
juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find [her] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."55
47477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
48 Id. at 496.
4' 505 U.S. 333, 350 (1992). The Court acknowledged that "'innocent of death' is not a
natural usage of' the words, but nevertheless stuck with that phrase to define the category of
relevant cases. See id. at 341.
5o Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for
Uniformity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1152-53 (2009).
s' Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350.
52 Id. at 346-47.
53 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).
54 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
5 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386-87 (2013) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 329 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Evidentiary Hearings. The Court, and later Congress, also infused
considerations of innocence into the rules about when evidentiary
hearings are appropriate in federal habeas proceedings. The Court
permitted evidentiary hearings where a petitioner "can show that a
fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a
federal evidentiary hearing."S 6 Congress partially codified this standard
in the AEDPA, which prohibits evidentiary hearings for state prisoners
unless the petitioner establishes that "the facts underlying the claim
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."5
Successive Petitions. Prior to the AEDPA, the Supreme Court held
that federal habeas courts could dismiss claims in successive petitions
where consistent with the "ends of justice." The Court later clarified
that "the 'ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain such
petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim
with a colorable showing of factual innocence."59 The AEDPA
subsequently changed the standards applicable to successive petitions.
For state prisoners, federal courts must now dismiss claims that were
presented in prior federal habeas petitions.60 Claims that were not
previously raised in prior petitions can be considered only if (1) they
rely "on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court"; or (2) "the factual predicate for
the claim could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence" and "the facts underlying the claim ... would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
56 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992).
1 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2012). The AEDPA modified the standard for evidentiary
hearings by eliminating the freestanding miscarriage of justice exception. See McQuiggin,
569 U.S. at 396-97 ("In a case not governed by those provisions ... the miscarriage of
justice exception survived AEDPA's passage intact and unrestricted.").
58 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1986); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,
230-31 (1924).
59 Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (invoking Friendly).
60 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2012). Several courts of appeals have applied this provision to
federal prisoners as well, reasoning that the phrase "must be certified as provided in section
2244" incorporates 2244(b)(1)'s requirement that claims presented in a prior application be
dismissed. See, e.g., In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2016); Taylor v. Gilkey,
314 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2002).
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constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense."6 1
Mandate Recalls. The Court also incorporated innocence into the
standard for when federal courts of appeals may recall the mandate in
habeas proceedings. As a general rule, a court of appeals may recall a
mandate in response to a motion filed by a litigant or on its own
initiative.62 While the AEDPA's restrictions on successive motions
limited courts' ability to recall a mandate in response to a motion by a
prisoner, or on the basis of "new claims or evidence presented in a
successive application for habeas relief," 63 the Court held that federal
courts may recall a mandate on the court's own initiative "to avoid a
miscarriage of justice," which it defined as a "strong showing of
'actua[l] innocen[ce].'" 6 4
2. Merits
Cognizability. In cases involving state prisoners, federal habeas courts
may not consider Fourth Amendment claims if the state prisoner had "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the claim in state courts.65
Citing Judge Friendly,6 6 the Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment
claims are generally not cognizable in federal habeas because they divert
attention "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be
the central concern" in habeas.67 The Court has not held any other
constitutional claim not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings,
although it did avoid a decision on whether a freestanding claim of
innocence was a cognizable ground for relief in federal habeas. In
distinguishing Stone v. Powell and Fourth Amendment claims, the Court
6 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2012). The same conditions apply to federal prisoners, except
they do not have to show diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012).
62 Fed. R. App. P.,41; Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 550 (1998) ("[C]ourts of
appeals . .. have an inherent power to recall their mandates, subject to review for an abuse of
discretion.").
63 Calderon, 523 U.S. at 553-54.
6 Id. at 554, 557-58.
65 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976).
66 Id. at 491-92 n.31.
67 Id. at 489-90.
68 In dicta, the Court stated in a footnote that Stone applied to "analogous federal cases
under 28 U.S.C. 2255," for federal prisoners. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562
n.20 (1982).
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has reasoned that other constitutional claims are cognizable because the
claims are relevant to whether the defendant is innocent. 6 9 For example,
in holding that Miranda claims may be raised in federal habeas
proceedings, the Court observed that Miranda does not "serve some
value necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt." 70
The Court has also incorporated innocence considerations in delineating
which statutory claims are cognizable in habeas proceedings: only
violations of federal laws that result in a "fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or deprivations of
rudimentary procedure are cognizable. 7 1
Retroactivity. Prior to the 1960s, Supreme Court decisions were fully
retroactive and applied to all criminal cases, including ones that had
become final. Beginning in the 1960s, the Court announced that it could
limit the retroactive effect of its decisions, including the effect on cases
that are on direct review (that is, before a petition for certiorari has been
denied or the time to file one has expired).72 Dissatisfied with that
approach, Justice Harlan proposed that all new constitutional rules
would apply to cases on direct review, but not to cases on collateral
review (that is, in federal habeas) unless the new rule satisfied certain
exceptions." One exception was for rules that "significantly improve the
pre-existing fact-finding procedures."7 4 Justice Harlan explained that
69 The Court also held other claims were cognizable without any mention of whether such
claims affected the likelihood that the defendant was innocent. See, e.g., Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986) (ineffective assistance claims predicated on
counsel's failure to make a Fourth Amendment objection); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
560-61 (1979) (grand jury discrimination claims).
70 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), held that confessions obtained in custodial interrogations are not admissible unless
accompanied by several warnings.
71 Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1994) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 428 (1962)).
72 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(listing examples); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965) (holding that the
Mapp rule does not require retrospective application
73 See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that new constitutional principles
should be applied to federal habeas cases in certain circumstances); Desist, 394 U.S. at 256-
69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same).
74 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262. Justice Harlan later walked away from this exception, proposing
in its place an exception for the retroactive application of rules "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). See id. at 693-95 (explaining reasons for modification).
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such rules should provide grounds for habeas relief because one of the
principal functions of habeas is "to assure that no man has been
incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large
risk that the innocent will be convicted."7 Justice Harlan likewise
offered a second exception to the general bar against retroactivity for
new decisions that "place[] 'certain kinds of primary individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."' 76
When Teague v. Lane ultimately purported to adopt Justice Harlan's
rules regarding retroactivity, it also incorporated the rules' innocence-
related exceptions.n Teague announced that a new constitutional rule
would apply retroactively if the rule "places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe'"7 8 as Justice Harlan suggested in Mackey. Teague
also directed that a new rule would apply retroactively if it was a
"watershed rule[] of criminal procedure" that implicates "the
fundamental fairnes§ of the trial" and "without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 79 Teague explained "our
cases have moved in the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the
likely accuracy of convictions in determining the available scope of
habeas review."so
The second Teague exception for watershed rules related to innocence
focused on factual innocence and the accuracy of convictions." The first
Teague exception for rules that place "certain kinds of . .. individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority"82
initially focused on one kind of legal innocence-when the defendant
was convicted under a statute that criminalized constitutionally protected
conduct. Although the defendant's conviction was accurate in that the
" Desist, 394 U.S. at 262.
7 6 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692).
n See id. at 305-10.
78 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692)).
7 1 Id. at 311-13.
80 Id. at 313.
81 Teague surmised that because "such procedures would be so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt," it is "unlikely that many such components of basic due
process have yet to emerge." Id. at 313. Subsequent cases have also described the second
exception as "extremely narrow." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417-18 (2007).




jury correctly ascertained both the facts and the defendant's guilt of the
charged offense, the Constitution prohibited the state from criminalizing
the defendant's conduct. As an example of rules that would be
retroactive under this exception, Justice Harlan listed Loving v. Virginia,
the case prohibiting criminalization of interracial marriages, and
Griswold v. Connecticut, the case prohibiting criminalization of married
couples obtaining birth control.
The first Teague exception quickly expanded to encompass other
types of legal innocence.8 4 The same year that Teague was decided, the
Court announced that Teague's first exception also included rules that
hold "the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a
certain penalty," meaning "rules prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense."8  The Court explained that a rule prohibiting States from
imposing the death penalty on persons with limited mental capacity
would, in effect, prohibit a category of punishment for a class of
defendants, generating what Kovarsky identified as death-ineligible
claims.8 6
Several years later, the Court announced that rules that narrow the
scope of a federal criminal statute by interpreting its terms also apply
retroactively. That decision, Bousley v. United States, framed Teague's
first exception explicitly in terms of innocence. The Court reiterated that
a principal function of habeas is to ensure that a defendant was not
"incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large
8 See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 n.7 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
84 In a sentence purporting to describe the first exception, Justice Harlan maintained that
"the writ has historically been available for attacking convictions on such grounds," (id. at
692-93) and listed such grounds as a federalism challenge to a federal statute (which, if
successful, would presumably have allowed the state to penalize the relevant conduct) (id. at
693 n.8) (listing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)). Justice Harlan also listed as "such
grounds" falling under the first exception "cases collected" in the footnote of an article by
Professor Anthony Amsterdam, which included vagueness challenges (which, if successful,
would not have prohibited the criminalization of conduct under a more precisely worded
statute) (id.) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizures, And Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 384 n.30 (1964) (citing In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210
(1911)).
8s Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
86 See id.
87 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616, 620-21 (1998).
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risk that the innocent will be convicted."" And with that framing, the
Court explained that "decisions of this Court holding that a substantive
federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct, like decisions
placing conduct 'beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe,' necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of 'an act that the law does not make criminal."' 89 Attempting
to generalize Teague's first exception, the Court has emphasized that
rules falling under the exception apply retroactively "because they
'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant' . . . faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him" or was convicted of
something the law does not criminalize. 90
Two recent cases have further solidified the Court's expanding
definition of legal innocence. Welch v. United States held that a rule
invalidating the Armed Career Criminal Act's ("ACCA") residual clause
was retroactive. The ACCA imposed both a mandatory minimum
sentence and raised the statutory maximum sentence for defendants
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.91 The Court held
that the ACCA's residual clause was constitutionally void for vagueness,
meaning that Congress could have rewritten the provision in a different,
lawful way to impose the same penalty on the same defendants.92
Moreover, defendants who were sentenced under the ACCA were
convicted of conduct that the law could, and still did, criminalize-being
a felon in possession of a firearm. However, in this case the defendants
received additional, mandatory punishment (terms of imprisonment)
under an invalid statute (the ACCA's residual clause). Without the
ACCA, the remaining statutes made these defendants eligible for a
maximum of ten years in prison, whereas the ACCA required that they
be sentenced to at least fifteen years. 93 The Court concluded that the
ACCA "produce[d] a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does
88Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
89 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) and
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgement in
part and dissenting in part).
90 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004); id. at 352 (quoting Bousley, 523
U.S. at 620).
91 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016).
92 Id. at 1262, 1267 (noting this).
9 See id. at 1261.
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not make criminal."94 After the ACCA was invalidated, the same person
engaging in the same conduct is no longer covered by the Act.
Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana,95 the Court made retroactive a
rule (Miller v. Alabama96) that invalidated the mandatory imposition of
life without parole on juveniles.97 Miller did not "foreclose a sentencer's
ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile." 98 But, Montgomery
reasoned, Miller rested on the idea that "sentencing a child to life
without parole" would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eight Amendment "for all but 'the rare juvenile
offender."' 99 Therefore, Miller was a substantive rule because, unless
applied, there was a significant risk that "the vast majority of juvenile
offenders" faced a punishment (life without parole) that was prohibited
by the Constitution. 100 The Court again gestured toward innocence
considerations as it applied Miller retroactively. Citing Judge Friendly's
article on innocence, the Court explained that "[a] conviction or
sentence imposed in violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous
but contrary to law and, as a result void."101 Those decisions produced a
class of persons whose conduct was not (lawfully) criminalized or
punished.
II. LEGAL INNOCENCE AS INNOCENCE
There is little to like in the Court's recent federal habeas cases. 102 But
habeas doctrine has outpaced scholarship's focus on innocence in one
respect-identifying the kinds of innocence that warrant special
94 Id. at 1265 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352).
9s 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
96 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
9 7 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 718.
98 Id. at 726.
99 Id. at 734 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
100 Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004))
101 Id. at 731 (citing Friendly, supra note 1, at 151).
102 See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 1219, 1219-22 (2015).
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consideration." These kinds of legal innocence include instances
where:
* a defendant was convicted under a statute that, properly
interpreted, did not reach her conduct;
* a defendant was convicted under a statute that could have
prohibited her conduct but did not do so lawfully;
* a defendant was sentenced under a statute that, properly
interpreted, did not apply to the defendant;
* a defendant was sentenced to additional time in prison under a
statute that could have imposed the additional prison time but
did not do so lawfully; and
* a defendant received a noncapital sentence that is prohibited
by the Constitution.
In these cases, the defendant was either convicted under a statute that
did not lawfully prohibit his conduct, or sentenced under a statute that
did not lawfully impose the sentence he received. 104 Also included in the
category of legal innocence are cases where a defendant was convicted
of conduct that cannot be constitutionally criminalized, but that is not a
recent addition to the category. These defendants were wrongfully
subject to statutes that authorized criminal punishment based on the
defendant's conduct or characteristics, either because of an error of
statutory interpretation or a constitutional error about the statute's
validity.
103 A recent example is Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in the decision to vacate and
remand for further proceedings a case where the United States noted that a federal prisoner
was wrongly sentenced to a 20-year mandatory minimum statute that was later interpreted
not to apply to him. Hicks v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2000, 2000-01 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) ("A plain legal error infects this judgment-a man was wrongly sentenced to 20
years in prison under a defunct statute .... [W]ho wouldn't hold a rightly diminished view
of our courts if we allowed individuals to linger longer in prison than the law requires only
because we were unwilling to correct our own obvious mistakes?"). Another arguable
example is the recent Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018), which held that
defendants do not, merely by entering a guilty plea, waive the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under which they were convicted. As Class observed, such
claims "challenge the Government's power to criminalize [the defendant's] (admitted)
conduct" and "thereby call into question the Government's power to 'constitutionally
prosecute' him." Id., at 805 (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989)).
104 See Hicks, 137 S. Ct. at 2000.
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Are these new kinds of innocence even properly characterized as
innocence? Section II.A defines the types of cases in which a defendant
should be considered legally innocent, focusing on definitions supported
by the current doctrine. Section II.B argues that these kinds of legal
innocence are conceptually of a piece with the kinds of factual
innocence that courts and scholars would like to make part of federal
habeas law.10 Section II.C also argues that despite the conceptual
similarities between factual and legal innocence, many of the difficulties
that would result from making federal habeas more receptive to factual
innocence claims would not apply to legal innocence claims. Tying the
various procedural restrictions on habeas to legal innocence may even
further some of the reform goals that have animated restrictions on
federal habeas.
A. Recognizing Legal Innocence
1. Statutory Interpretation
One kind of "legal innocence" arises when a defendant has been
convicted or sentenced under a statute that, properly interpreted, does
not apply to the defendant.
a. Offenses
One example of this kind of innocence arose in Bousley v. United
States, where the defendant pled guilty to the charge that he knowingly
and intentionally used firearms "during and in relation to any ... drug
trafficking crime" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).1 0 6 The defendant
admitted to selling methamphetamine'ov and to storing two pistols in
1os In other work, I expand on constitutional dimensions of legal innocence that should
make freestanding legal innocence claims a basis for federal habeas relief even for state
prisoners. See Leah M. Litman, The Constitutional Significance and Scope of Legal
Innocence (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Litman, Constitutional
Significance]. The project in this Article, however, is to show the conceptual similarities
between factual and legal innocence in ways that matter to federal habeas so that legal
innocence can piggyback into spaces where the doctrine is already amenable to factual
innocence.
" 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616.
107 Brief for the United States, Bousley, 523 U.S. 614 (No. 96-8516), 1997 WL 805418, at
*5.
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close proximity to the drugs.'08 But the Supreme Court later interpreted
the phrase "knowingly and intentionally used. . . firearms" to mean
"active employment of a firearm," not "merely ... storing a weapon
near drugs."' 09 Thus, a defendant who merely placed a firearm near
drugs was not actually guilty of the crime established by 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) and was legally innocent as a result.
b. Sentences
A defendant may also be legally innocent when he was sentenced
under a statute that, properly interpreted, does not apply to him. The
difference between a statute that establishes a new offense and a statute
that provides for a sentencing enhancement may not always be clear. 110
Whether a defendant is innocent of an offense, as opposed to a sentence,
may not always be clear. Sometimes a statute creates a new offense by
providing for additional penalties depending on the offense conduct. For
example, Section 924(c) imposes a sentence on defendants who use a
firearm while committing a "drug trafficking crime," and provides for a
term of imprisonment "in addition to" whatever sentence might be given
for the drug trafficking crime." But a defendant can be charged and
convicted of violating only Section 924(c) and not the underlying drug
trafficking crime. 112 As a result, Section 924(c) defines a standalone
crime even though it appears to impose additional penalties on
defendants who are guilty of a separate offense. Other statutes establish
different penalties for reasons other than the offense conduct. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits persons convicted of felonies
from possessing a firearm,H3 and the statutory penalties section provides
that defendants convicted of violating Section 922(g) will be
108 Brief for the Petitioner, Bousley, 523 U.S. 614 (No. 96-8516), 1997 WL 728537, at *5,
*9; Brief for the United States, Bousley, 523 U.S. 614 (No. 96-8516), 1997 WL 805418, at
*5.
109 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
110 See Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 499, 510 (2014)
[hereinafter Garret, Accuracy in Sentencing].
. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
1 12 Id. (stating that the use of the firearm must be in connection to a crime "for which the
person may be prosecuted").
"' Id. § 922(g)(1).
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"imprisoned not more than 10 years."ll 4 The ACCA, however, subjects
certain persons convicted under Section 922(g) to a statutory sentencing
enhancement-persons convicted under Section 922(g) must receive
"not less than fifteen years" imprisonment if they have three previous
convictions for "a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.""'
Wherever the precise line between a standalone offense and a
sentence-enhancing statute falls, the Court's recent decision in Welch v.
United States contemplates that a defendant can be innocent of a non-
capital sentence in addition to being innocent of an offense." 6 Welch
held retroactive a decision invalidating a provision of the ACCA, which
the Court views as a sentence-enhancing statute.' '7 The Court repeatedly
equated a decision that alters the scope of a sentence-enhancing statute,
such as the ACCA, with a decision that alters the scope of a standalone
offense, such as Section 924(c)."
Although the doctrine contemplates that some defendants may be
legally innocent of their sentences, it is not clear what class of
petitioners this applies to, and specifically whether a petitioner can be
legally innocent of his sentence when he received a sentence that does
114 Id. § 924(a)(2).
115 Id. § 924(e)(1).
116 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). This notion is also contemplated in Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
1 The Court has held that recidivism-a defendant's criminal history-is a sentencing
factor, not an element that establishes a new offense, even when it serves as the reason for
enhanced punishment under a statute. Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1262-63, 1268 (petitioner's crime
of conviction is being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he is sentenced under the
Armed Career Criminal Act); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015)
(same); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998) (referring to
recidivism as a sentencing factor). But Almendarez-Torres has been questioned, Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013), and the Court has also described statutes
that subject defendants to harsher sentences based on the fact of a prior conviction as
creating a separate offense. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 567 & n.3
(2010).
118 See, e.g., Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing Schriro's characterization of Bousley to
explain why rule in Johnson is substantive); id. at 1267-68 (invoking Bousley to explain
why rule in Johnson is substantive). While Welch involved a decision that invalidated a
provision of the ACCA rather than interpreted it, Welch was clear that did not matter to
whether the petitioner was legally innocent. See id. at 1267 ("Neither Bousley nor any other
case from this Court treats statutory interpretation cases as a special class of decisions . . .").
Appellate courts also uniformly treat decisions interpreting the ACCA as retroactive. See
Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson's Potential Ruling
on ACCA's Constitutionality, 115 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 55, 63 n.43 (2015).
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not exceed the valid, statutory maximum for his offense. Welch involved
a set of defendants who received sentences that exceeded the statutory
maximum sentence for their offense of conviction. 119 By statute,
defendants who are convicted of violating Section 922(g) can receive at
most 10 years imprisonment, but the ACCA changes that by imposing a
mandatory minimum of at least 15 years imprisonment. 120 Bousley
likewise involved defendants who received a discrete, additional term of
imprisonment: Bousley involved a set of defendants convicted and
sentenced under Section 924(c), which imposes sentences "in addition
to" whatever sentence the defendant received for the other crime. 121
Section 924(c) therefore made it easy to disaggregate the 5-year (or
more) sentence a defendant received under Section 924(c) from the
sentence the defendant may have received for the drug trafficking
crime.122 If the defendant was only convicted of violating Section
924(c), the entirety of the prisoner's sentence was based on the Section
924(c) conviction.
It may not be as easy to identify what particular term of imprisonment
a defendant is innocent of when the defendant has been mistakenly
sentenced under a statute that supplies a new mandatory minimum
sentence but does not change a defendant's statutory maximum
sentence. It would be similarly difficult in cases where a statute supplies
a new statutory maximum sentence but does not change a defendant's
statutory minimum sentence. 123 For example, the relevant statutes might
have provided that defendants convicted of violating Section 922(g)
could be sentenced to up to 25 years, and the ACCA might have
required Section 922(g) defendants with multiple prior convictions to be
sentenced to at least 15 years. If a defendant was sentenced under the
ACCA, but the ACCA, as properly interpreted, did not apply to him, the
defendant would still be "innocent" of the ACCA sentence. But it would
not be as easy to disaggregate the ACCA sentence of which the
defendant is innocent because he could have received the same sentence
had he not been sentenced under the ACCA. The same could also occur
when a defendant is sentenced under a statute that supplies a different
"' See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268.
120 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (2012).
121 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
122 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
123 See Garrett, supra note 110, at 510 (noting overlap).
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statutory maximum.124 While there are good reasons why defendants
who are mistakenly sentenced under provisions that establish either a
mandatory minimum, or a new statutory maximum sentence, are legally
innocent, this project focuses on defendants sentenced above the
statutory maximum for their offense, a type of legal innocence the Court
has explicitly recognized. 125
2. Statutory Invalidation
Other kinds of legal innocence arise when a defendant has been
convicted or sentenced under a statute that is unconstitutional. The
statute may be unconstitutional either because the Constitution forbids
certain conduct from being criminalized, or because it forbids a state
from imposing a particular punishment on an offender or for a particular
offense. A statute may also be unconstitutional because it forbids
conduct or imposes penalties in an unconstitutional manner. All of these
cases also result in defendants who are legally innocent.
a. Constitutional Immunities
Offenses. One kind of legal innocence arises from constitutional rules
that protect certain individual conduct. For example, the Constitution
protects a consenting adult's ability to engage in sexual conduct with
another consenting adult. States may not, as a result, criminalize sex acts
between two consenting adults, regardless of whether those acts involve
individuals of the same or opposite sex. 126 The Constitution also protects
an individual's right to express herself by burning a flag, and so the
government may not criminalize flag burning.1 2 7
Defendants who are convicted of conduct that cannot be
constitutionally criminalized are legally innocent because the law could
not make their actions criminal. When a court holds that a federal or
124 For example, the relevant statutes might have provided that defendants convicted of
violating § 922(g) could be sentenced to up to 25 years and that § 922(g) defendants with
multiple prior convictions could be sentenced to up to 35 years. It would be relatively easy to
disaggregate the ACCA sentence of which a defendant might be innocent if the defendant
were sentenced to more than 25 years. But it would not be so easy for defendants sentenced
to fewer than 25 years.
125 See Litman, Constitutional Significance, supra note 105.
126 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 420 (1989).
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state statute is facially unconstitutional, the general rule is that the statue
is "void ab initio," meaning "null from the beginning."l 2 8 As the Court
has explained, "an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed." 29 Because no operative law criminalized the defendant's
conduct, defendants convicted under unconstitutional statutes are legally
innocent.
Sentences. Other constitutional rules forbid the government from
imposing only certain kinds of penalties. The Constitution forbids
punishments that are cruel and unusual, which include punishments that
are grossly disproportionate to the defendant's offense.130 The
Constitution also includes several categorical immunities that prohibit
states from imposing particular punishments in a defined set of cases.
The most common examples are categorical immunities from capital
punishment. The Constitution forbids states from imposing capital
punishment on certain offenders, such as juveniles' or individuals with
intellectual disabilities.1 32 The Constitution also forbids states from
imposing capital punishment for some offenses, such as rape 3 3 or
certain kinds of felony murder.1 34 There are also categorical immunities
128 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 195 (2009) ("The general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of law, is
in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose. Since
unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the
decision so branding it, an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if
it had never been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab initio."); Void ab initio,
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
730-31 (2016) (invoking the idea that unconstitutional statutes are "contrary to law and, as a
result, void"); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 216 (3d ed. 2000) ("If an
unconstitutional statute or practice effectively never existed as a lawful justification for state
action, individuals convicted under the statute or in trials which tolerated the practice were
convicted unlawfully even if their trials took place before the declaration of
unconstitutionality...").
129 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
130 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
131 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
132 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
133 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion).
134 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982).'
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from non-capital sentences. The Constitution forbids states from
imposing life without parole on juveniles for nonhomicide offenses1 3 5 or
on juveniles who are not incorrigible. 13 6 It also disallows states from
imposing mandatory life without parole on juveniles for homicide
offenses.1 3 7
Defendants who receive sentences that cannot be constitutionally
imposed on them are also legally innocent-but solely of their sentence
rather than their offense. While defendants who are legally innocent of
their offense cannot be punished at all, defendants who are legally
innocent of their sentence cannot be punished to the extent prescribed
under the law. These laws are also treated as void and inoperative. 13
The idea that sentence innocence is a kind of innocence has already
appeared in the Court's doctrine, as has the intuition that sentence
innocence overlaps substantially with offense innocence.139  In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, which 'held that states are constitutionally
required to give retroactive effect to the rule that juveniles cannot be
sentenced under statutes that mandate life without parole, the Court
explained that "the same logic governs a challenge to" punishment and
convictions.1 40 In equating the two, Montgomery cited Friendly's work
on innocence.' 4 1
b. Constitutional Means
Another kind of legal innocence arises when a defendant has been
convicted under a statute that is unconstitutional in its current form. In
these cases, the government could both criminalize the defendant's same
conduct and impose the same punishment under a valid statute, but the
13 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
136 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct.
11, 12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
137 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
1 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730-31.
139 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 343 (1992) ("[T]he concept of 'actual innocence'
could be applied to mean 'innocent' of the death penalty. .
140 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016).
141 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731; see also id. ("In support of its holding that a conviction
obtained under an unconstitutional law warrants habeas relief, the Siebold Court explained
that '[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.' A penalty imposed pursuant to an
unconstitutional law is no less void because the prisoner's sentence became final before the
law was held unconstitutional.").
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statute was not written in a constitutionally acceptable manner at the
time of the crime. For example, the Due Process Clause forbids the
government from enacting criminal statutes that are so unclear they fail
to provide reasonable people with fair notice of what the statute
prohibits-aptly referred to as "void for vagueness."1 4 2 Criminal statutes
that are invalidated on vagueness grounds are void and inoperative just
like statutes that criminalize protected conduct. 143 Defendants who are
convicted under those statutes are therefore also legally innocent. 144
In Welch, the Court explained that defendants who were sentenced
under a provision of the ACCA found to be unconstitutionally void for
vagueness are indistinguishable from defendants sentenced under a
provision that never applied to them in the first place. 145 In both cases,
the defendant is legally innocent of his or her sentence. 14 6
To take stock: legal innocence occurs when the criminal justice
system wrongfully subjected a defendant to a statute that authorized
criminal punishment based on the defendant's conduct or characteristics.
It can occur either because of an error of statutory interpretation
(wrongfully interpreting the statute to apply to the defendant), or
because of a constitutional error about the statute's validity (concluding
that the statute was constitutional). To understand the contours of legal
142 U.S. Const. amend V; Id. amend. XIV; see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551, 2556-57 (2015) ("[Vagueness] principles apply not only to statutes defining elements
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences."); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-
58 (1983).
143 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731 ("A conviction or sentence imposed in violation of
a substantive rule is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void."); Welch,
136 S. Ct. at 1265 ("[T]he rule announced in Johnson is substantive.")
144 Welch explained these cases would generate legally innocent defendants, just as
decisions invalidating a statutory sentencing enhancement on vagueness grounds would:
For instance, a decision that invalidates as void for vagueness a statute prohibiting
"conduct annoying to persons passing by," cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
612, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), would doubtless alter the range of
conduct that the law prohibits. That would make it a substantive decision under our
precedent.
136 S. Ct. at 1266.
145 See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265.
146 See id. at 1265-66. The same restrictions Subsection II.A.1 discussed about the kinds
of sentencing provisions that may generate legal innocent defendants when the provisions
are interpreted apply here when those provisions are invalidated.
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innocence, it is helpful to establish a backdrop of concepts that legal
innocence parallels as well as those from which it diverges. In some
respects, legal innocence resulting from an error of statutory
interpretation is similar to sufficiency of the evidence claims, which
concern whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1 4 7 But sufficiency claims
do not challenge the nature and contours of the crime that the jury was
supposed to determine if the defendant committed. That is, in
sufficiency claims, the defendant's argument takes the nature of the
offense and the legal definition of the crime as a given and challenges
whether the facts at trial establish that the defendant committed that
crime (as described to the jury and interpreted by a court).
Legal innocence that results from an error of statutory interpretation
may present as a claim that the jury instructions omitted or misdescribed
an element of the criminal offense, thereby denying a defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find every element of the criminal
offense. If a court misinterprets a statute and fails to instruct the jury as
to all of the elements of the offense, the jury will, naturally, be unable to
make findings on every element of the offense.1 48 A similar result would
occur if a court misinterpreted a statute in the context of a plea colloquy,
and the defendant pled guilty without fully understanding the elements
of the offense. But the nature of the violation would be different in those
circumstances; the claim would be that the defendant's plea agreement
was not intelligently made and was therefore unconstitutional. 149
This definition of legal innocence does not include defendants who
were convicted or sentenced under a valid statute in a proceeding that
may have been infected by other constitutional errors. For example, even
if the defendant's conviction was based on hearsay evidence, violating
his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses, the defendant is
147 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
148 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1999) (addressing a claim that the
jury was improperly instructed in violation of the Sixth Amendment because the court
misinterpreted a statute not to contain a particular element).
149Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618-19 (1997) ("We have long held that a plea does not qualify as
intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives 'real notice of the true nature of the
charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due
process.' . . . Petitioner nonetheless maintains that his guilty plea was unintelligent because
the District Court subsequently misinformed him as to the elements of a § 924(c)(1)
offense.... Were this contention proved, petitioner's plea would be ... constitutionally
invalid." (citations omitted)).
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not legally innocent;' 50 neither is a defendant whose conviction or
sentence was obtained without the effective assistance of counsel, also
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'
Part of the reason for this definition of legal innocence is that it takes
the existing doctrine as a starting point, and there are no doctrinal
indications that courts view procedural errors such as Confrontation
Clause violations as errors that are species of innocence. There are,
however, plenty of indications that courts treat as varieties of innocence
cases where defendants were wrongfully subjected to statutes imposing
criminal punishment because of an error of statutory interpretation or a
constitutional error about the statute's validity.
Another reason for this definition of legal innocence is conceptual.
Where a defendant's conviction or sentence resulted from an error like
the Confrontation Clause or right to counsel, he or she may still be guilty
of the offense of conviction. That is not true for defendants who were
convicted or sentenced under unlawful statutes or statutes that did not
apply to them; they are not guilty of a criminal offense. This means that
the latter set of cases (cases of legal innocence) overlap more with
factual innocence than do the former set of cases (cases involving errors
of criminal procedure). And the similarities between factual and legal
innocence suggest that federal habeas should be available for both kinds
of innocence claims, whereas the differences between them reveal that
there may be fewer concerns with litigating legal innocence claims than
factual innocence claims.
B. The New Innocence?
The Supreme Court has described the kinds of cases from Section
II.A as cases of innocence. Bousley, for example, maintained that
decisions narrowing the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
terms apply in federal habeas proceedings because a principal function
of habeas is to minimize the "risk that the innocent will be convicted."' 5 2
Subsequent cases have underscored that decisions invalidating statutes
on grounds that would not prevent Congress from criminalizing the
same conduct or imposing the same punishment under a differently
150 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
152 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621-22.
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constructed statute concern innocence,1 53 as are cases where no valid
statute authorized the defendant's sentence.1 54
But apart from the fact that the doctrine has started to describe these
as cases of innocence, should they be treated as such? This Part suggests
that they should be for several reasons. Most importantly, there is
conceptual overlap between factual and legal innocence, and both raise
similar concerns in relation to theories of punishment.
1. Conceptual Overlap
Legal innocence cases are, in important ways, similar to cases of
factual innocence. In both cases, the defendant did not do whatever act
was prohibited by the law under which he was convicted or sentenced.
In factual innocence cases, new facts or evidence reveal what the
defendant did, and establish that the defendant's conduct was not a
crime or did not warrant additional punishment. The same is true in legal
innocence cases. Even without new facts or evidence, whatever the
defendant did was not a crime, or did not warrant additional punishment.
In cases of legal innocence, the statute under which the defendant was
convicted or sentenced does not authorize the defendant's detention
either because the statute does not apply to the defendant or because the
statute is invalid. Cases of factual and legal innocence both result in
defendants who did something that was not a crime. Every factually
innocent person is legally innocent in the sense that they did not commit
an act that was lawfully prohibited by the statute of their conviction.
Because both factual and legal innocence cases involve defendants
who are not guilty of a crime, similar concerns are present in both kinds
of cases. In a recent article, Professor Dan Epps surveyed the concerns
that have motivated the legal system's attempts to prevent the conviction
153 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393(2013) (characterizing Bousley as holding
"that actual innocence may overcome a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection
on direct review"); see also Welch, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1267 (2016).
154 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731 (citing Friendly, supra note 1, at 151); Welch, 136
S. Ct. at 1265 (invoking innocence considerations of whether conduct was criminal); Dretke
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 397 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("because that ... resulted in the
imposition of an unauthorized sentence, it also follows that respondent is a 'victim of a
miscarriage of justice...'") (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)); Dretke,
541 U.S. at 399 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing case where "an individual has been
sentenced for a crime he did not commit").
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of the innocent."' One of the primary concerns Epps discusses is the
severity of criminal sanctions, which include harsh terms of
imprisonment, collateral consequences that prevent the defendant's
ability to participate fully in civil society, and social stigma, among
others. 15 6 Because of the severe impact of conviction on the individual,
Epps explains, there is a particular concern with ensuring that criminal
law's consequences are not imposed on defendants who are not actually
guilty of a crime.5 7 That concern is equally present in legal innocence
cases.
There are similar concerns when the defendant is innocent of his
particular sentence. Sentencing provisions can trigger a wide range of
consequences, including additional years of imprisonment (sometimes
doubling a prisoner's sentence); a different kind of punishment (such as
capital punishment); different collateral consequences (such as
eligibility for public benefits or subsequent criminal penalties); and
others."' The severity of any one of these different sanctions and the
attendant consequences for the defendant makes it important to ensure
that a particular sanction is only applied to persons who are actually
subject to it. Distinctions among sentences, and the applicability of any
particular sentencing statute, are especially essential given the
increasingly expansive criminal prohibitions which apply to a wide
swath of conduct. As Professor Erik Luna has written, some states
punish marketing techniques for perfumes and lotion; others prohibit
disturbing a congregation by "engaging in boisterous or noisy
amusement"; others bar spitting in public spaces or disturbing pigeons;
and others prohibit juveniles from smoking or not attending school.15 1
155 See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
1065 (2015). Epps's project was to critically examine whether a criminal justice system
should adopt, as a theory of punishment, a preference for errors of the kind where a guilty
defendant goes free or errors of the kind where an innocent defendant is convicted.
15 Id. at 1088-89.
1s7 Id.
158 See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 695, 706-08
(2017) (identifying increasingly draconian punishments); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral
Consequences, 104 Geo. L.J. 1197, 1206-10 (2016) (cataloguing different collateral
consequences).
159 See Erik Luna, The Overcrinminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 704
(2005). Professor Alexandra Natapoff's work has documented how almost ten million
criminal misdemeanor cases are filed each year. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313. 1313-15 (2012).
2018] 449
Virginia Law Review
There are fewer cases where the question is whether the defendant's
conduct is criminalized; the question is often instead to what extent the
defendant's conduct is penalized. 160
2. Theories ofPunishment
Legal innocence also raises similar concerns as factual innocence
with respect to the purported purposes of criminal law and punishment:
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.161 Indeed, no
firm line separates the two kinds of innocence when it comes to the
theories of punishment, which, to whatever extent they operate in our
criminal justice system, are tied to whether a defendant has committed a
legal wrong. The criminal justice system exacts retribution and deters
conduct with coercive sanctions through a process that first depends on
identifying an act as criminal; only then is any kind of retribution or
deterrence warranted. The theories of punishment do not authorize or
justify punishment for any kind of wrong, moral or otherwise; they
justify punishment only for those wrongs that are identified as such by
criminal law.
The claim that different theories of punishment do not justify
punishment for acts that haven't been criminalized may have a kind of
"just so" feel to it. But the claim has some basis in the different theories
of punishment.1 6 2 Tying the theories of punishment to whether an act is
160 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L.
Rev. 1276, 1278-79 (2005) (noting rise of "harsher sentences"); Malcolm C. Young, Special
Interests, Principles, and Sentencing Reform in America, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
1509, 1510 (2006) ("in pursuit of a claim of near-innocence for the alleged victims of
'overcriminalization,' the authors of these chapters sidestep the central issue in sentencing,
which is simply what amount of punishment a society should impose on wrongdoers.").
161 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 Geo. L.J. 1, 17-18 (2005). The Supreme Court has declared that the "two primary
objectives of criminal punishment" are "retribution and deterrence." See, e.g., Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997). I do not defend any one of these principles as a
basis for punishment, but raise them only to show that, if they do not authorize the
punishment of a factually innocent person, they also do not authorize the punishment of a
legally innocent person.
162 The claim has some basis in the different theories of punishment. However retribution
is framed, it does not justify the punishment of a legally innocent individual because there is
no legal wrong or crime to be remedied. See, e.g., J. Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and
Punishment 40-60 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining retribution). For retributivists, an individual
must "previously [be] found punishable before any thought can be given to drawing from his
punishment something of use for himself or his fellow citizens." Immanuel Kant, The
Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, 473 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996)
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made criminal by statute reflects the idea that laws function as a way for
society to express, through its elected representatives, the majority's
preferences against certain behaviors.1 63 Criminal laws are therefore one
means-and the only recognized operative means-of expressing a
judgment about what acts warrant retribution or deterrence. Legislatures
define crimes and ascribe penalties for them that prosecutors may
choose to pursue or juries may elect to impose.
With respect to whether the purposes of criminal laws and criminal
punishment are being served, defendants who are legally innocent
because of an error of statutory interpretation are similarly situated to
defendants who are factually innocent. A defendant who is legally
innocent because of an error of statutory interpretation committed an act
that the law, properly interpreted, does not make criminal, or received a
punishment that the law, properly interpreted, does not actually impose.
Legally innocent defendants did not commit an act that has been
identified as punishable, so their punishment is not justified on grounds
of retribution. Legally innocent defendants also have not committed an
act that the law has elected to deter.
Legal innocence cases may have a different moral valence than
factual innocence cases, as legally innocent defendants may have done
something wrong or immoral, unlike factually innocent defendants.
Imagine, for example, a legally innocent defendant who robbed a bank,
but carried with him a fake gun rather than a real one, such that the
crime didn't amount to armed robbery under the relevant statute. By
contrast, the most common example of a factually innocent defendant
would be a defendant who was at home watching a movie instead of
robbing a bank.
(1797) (emphasis omitted). The same is true when viewed from the perspective of
deterrence. Punishing a legally innocent defendant is unwarranted because a legally innocent
defendant has not committed an act that the law can deter or has elected to deter in coercive
ways. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
169-72, 175-76 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789) (where
punishment is groundless, the suffering inflicted on the convicted criminal outweighs benefit
to society); see also John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in Collected Papers 20, 28 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999) (social utility requires a conviction to be guilty).
163 See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of The Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L.
Rev. 1529, 1550-76 (2000) (explaining while complicating the claim that the federal
legislature is majoritarian).
16 See Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 Yale
L.J. 2236, 2274, 2275 n.147 (2014).
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The reality, however, is that the two kinds of cases lie along a
continuum, rather than being separated by a clear line, when it comes to
issues like morality. In factual innocence cases, whether the defendant's
conviction and sentence serves the purposes of criminal punishment is
tied to whether the defendant actually committed his offense of
conviction-not to general notions of wrongdoing.1 65 Imagine that a
defendant is accused of robbing a bank, but he has a videotape of
himself having sex with a person who is not his spouse and who did not
consent to the videotaping that is timestamped at the time when he was
supposedly robbing the bank. Even though secretly taping a sexual
encounter is wrong and should be deterred, it does not follow that the
defendant's robbery conviction should be upheld.1 6 6 Indeed, even if the
defendant's nonconsensual videotaping is unlawful, it does not follow
that his robbery conviction should be upheld. The two courses of
conduct may be subject to different punishments and in order to warrant
punishment, the defendant's nonconsensual videotaping would have to
be subject to the entire criminal process. Nor is it the case that factual
innocence is reserved for people who are entirely not blameworthy. That
is particularly true for offenders whom the Court has recognized can be
innocent of a death sentence, without being innocent of the underlying
crime. 6 1
While legal innocence cases that involve statutory interpretation share
important similarities with factual innocence cases, legal innocence
cases that involve statutory invalidation are not on all fours with cases of
factual innocence with respect to the purposes of punishment.1 6 8 Where
165 A recent paper by Gabriel Mendlow argues that the "wrong" that a statute punishes is
related to the elements of the crime, though imperfectly as not all elements may be part of
the wrong a statute punishes, and some statutes may punish wrongs that aren't a combination
of some elements of the offense. See Gabriel Mendlow, The Elusive Object of Punishment
(Dec. 11, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3083083 [https:// perma
.cc/LPA4-ET44]. But, Mendlow writes, "[t]he wrong a law criminalizes" is "the product
of.. . factors, including ... what the law says" as well as "the way various officials exercise
their discretion to charge, convict, and sentence." Id. at *4. For example, Mendlow notes
"conditional" elements that establish "when to punish rather than what to punish for," such
as statutes of limitations. Id. at * 13.
166 Id. at 13 ("We may punish a person under a criminal statute only if he satisfies the
statute's elements.").
167 E.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 343-46 (1992).
168 Legal innocence cases may also differ from some factual innocence cases in which the
wrong person has been convicted of a crime. In legal innocence cases, however, it may be
that there was no crime at all.
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legal innocence results from statutory invalidation, the democratic
process has identified the defendant's act as unlawful, punishable, and
worthy of deterrence. But the Constitution sometimes prevents the
democratic process from reaching that conclusion. Where the
Constitution prohibits the defendant's conduct from being criminalized,
or prohibits the defendant from receiving the sentence that he did, the
calculus for purposes of the theories of punishment has already been
made-the democratic process cannot choose to punish that conduct or
punish the offender to the degree that it did. In some cases where the
Constitution prohibits lawmakers from imposing punishment in the
manner that a law prescribes, there may be questions about whether the
democratic process has actually imposed punishment, namely when the
law is unclear about what conduct is prohibited.
C. Resistance to Innocence
Several of the concerns, such as the staleness of evidence or the drain
on resources in retrials, that Judge Friendly raised about the federal
habeas process are echoed in Supreme Court decisions that have
narrowed the scope of federal habeas review.1 6 9 Although Friendly
hoped to address these concerns by reorienting habeas around
innocence, many of the issues he raised about the current federal habeas
system would also apply to any federal habeas system that is devoted to
remedying claims of factual innocence. Litigating factual innocence
claims, like Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment claims, takes time and
resources and requires federal courts to redetermine events that may
have occurred a long time ago.
This section argues that these critiques may apply with less force to
claims of legal innocence. The general critiques of federal habeas
relitigation almost uniformly envision fact-dependent claims that would
result in subsequent proceedings attempting to reanswer questions that
the original proceeding already attempted to resolve. Many of these
concerns are not as applicable to legal innocence claims because there
may not be retrials, and sentence innocence claims in particular are not
susceptible to many of the problems with federal relitigation or factual
innocence claims. Here, too, cases of legal innocence and factual
169 See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699, 706-28 (2002) (documenting
this).
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innocence lie along a continuum in how much they implicate critiques of
federal habeas relitigation.
1. Relitigation & Factual Innocence
Despite the draw of innocence in both doctrine and scholarship,
federal habeas has not yet adopted any kind of rule that allows
innocence claims to bypass the procedural restrictions on federal habeas
review. The Court has yet to even decide whether a freestanding claim
of factual innocence is a cognizable ground for federal habeas relief.1 7 0
Understanding why innocence proposals have not made additional
headway requires an analysis of the concerns with such proposals.
Judge Friendly recommended making federal collateral review about
innocence in order to address the perceived defects he saw in relitigating
"the asserted denial of a 'constitutional' right, even though this was or
could have been litigated in the criminal trial and on appeal."171 Friendly
drew on Bator's earlier article that had criticized the system for allowing
defendants to relitigate constitutional claims in federal habeas, and
pointed to the strain it put on judicial resources. Friendly claimed that
"the most serious single evil with ... collateral attack is its drain upon
the resources of the community." 72 Friendly and Bator also argued that
relitigation undermined criminal law's deterrent function and other
purposes of substantive criminal law, such as the societal interest in
finality.173
Although Friendly's solution was to make federal habeas focus on
innocence claims, many of the critiques he levied against relitigation
also apply to innocence claims, or at least some innocence claims.
Indeed, courts and scholars regularly use these same critiques to reject
proposals that would make federal habeas more receptive to factual
innocence claims. 174 Plausible claims of factual innocence are not hard
170 See Dist. Att'y's Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 (2009) (noting
"[w]hether such a federal right [to be released upon proof of actual innocence] exists is an
open question") (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006); Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 398-417 (1993)).
171 Friendly, supra note 1, at 154.
172 Id. at 148; see also id. at 146-48; Bator, supra note 9, at 446-47.
173 See supra Section I.A.
174 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401-04 (noting strain on resources and problems with
evidentiary decay for factual innocence claims); infra note 175-176, 178. {Master: Triple
digit cross reference}
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to make, and by their nature, factual innocence claims are fact intensive.
Litigating factual innocence claims would therefore strain judicial
resources and involve a considerable amount of fact-finding and
reconsidering stale evidence.1 5 At a minimum, these claims require an
examination of record evidence. But many claims will also require
courts to collect and consider additional evidence as they may involve
subsequently discovered facts. Factual innocence claims may involve
subsequent research or findings about the kind of evidence that was used
to convict the defendant, such as subsequent scientific research on the
validity of forensic evidence, or eyewitness testimony. Either way,
factual innocence claims involve collecting additional evidence and
assessing how and whether it discounts prior evidence of the defendant's
guilt. Additionally, any and all of the relevant evidence may have
become stale. Because federal collateral review occurs many years after
the relevant events occurred, redetermining the facts and events may be
impractical due to the passage of time.' 76
The Supreme Court has raised other concerns with factual innocence
claims as well. The Court has expressed uncertainty about the kind of
relief that might be warranted for factual innocence claims. If a court has
determined that the defendant was probably innocent in light of new
evidence he obtained, the Court wondered, a subsequent retrial seemed
inappropriate.177 And any retrial that might occur would suffer from
possible evidentiary decay.178
Some of the general critiques of the current federal habeas process are
equally applicable to legal innocence claims. These claims are formally
17 5 John H. Blume et. al, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and
King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 435, 460 (2011) (outlining reasons why litigating factual innocence
claims is burdensome); Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 Mich. L.
Rev. 887, 903-04 (2012) (same).
176 Brian Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 49 Duke L.J. 947, 1006-07 (2000).
177 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 402 (arguing that the petitioner was "understandably
imprecise in describing the sort of federal relief to which a suitable showing of actual
innocence would entitle him"); id. at 403 ("The dissent fails to articulate the relief that would
be available if petitioner were to meets [sic] its "probable innocence" standard. Would it be
commutation of petitioner's death sentence, new trial, or unconditional release from
imprisonment?"). A recent article has argued it would violate the double jeopardy clause to
retry the defendants. See Jordan M. Barry, Prosecuting the Exonerated: Actual Innocence
and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 535, 535 (2012).
178 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (noting "the enormous burden that having to retry cases
based on often stale evidence would place on the States.").
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available to prisoners during both the criminal trial and appeal. 179 A
defendant can always argue that the statute under which he was
convicted or sentenced was unconstitutional, or that it does not apply to
him. And although a court might not recognize the relevant
constitutional immunity or interpret the statute correctly until after the
defendant has been convicted or sentenced, there is little reason to
suspect that state or federal trial courts are particularly hostile to legal
innocence claims relative to other kinds of claims.s0
But legal innocence claims are not as susceptible to the resource-
based critiques of federal habeas relitigation or factual innocence claims
for several reasons. First, several kinds of legal innocence claims are
less fact dependent than factual innocence claims. Legal innocence
claims that depend on a constitutional immunity do not require courts to
consider or weigh the evidence that was used to convict the defendant.
These claims require courts to assess the constitutionality of a statute,
and whether it criminalizes protected conduct or imposes an unlawful
punishment. The same is true for legal innocence claims that argue a
statute was unconstitutional because of the way the statute was written,
or how it was enacted. Courts would assess what the statute says, or how
it was enacted, rather than any of the factual evidence from the
defendant's trial.
Even legal innocence claims premised on the idea that a statute,
properly interpreted, did not prohibit the defendant's conduct do not
require the same kind of factual redeterminations as pure factual
innocence claims. Some number of these claims will involve only an
assessment of whether the facts, as they were revealed at trial (or, more
likely, a plea colloquy), fall within the scope of a criminal prohibition,
properly interpreted."' Where the criminal prohibition has a lesser-
included offense (a prohibition with similar but fewer elements), 182
reviewing courts can enter judgments of acquittal on the statute whose
179 This claim is more complicated for guilty pleas. See, e.g., William Ortman, Probable
Cause Revisited, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 511, 552-58 (2016).
180 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415-16 (noting that states have provided remedies to innocent
defendants).
181 See infra Subsection III.A. 1.c (discussing how the remedy would work in cases of plea
bargains and offering modification to Bousley).
182 See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887 & n.3 (2014) (explaining why
Section 841(a)(1) is a lesser included offense of Section 841(b)(1)(C)).
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elements the prosecution failed to prove, but a judgment of conviction
on a lesser-included offense.183
In this way, adjudicating a legal innocence claim may not
meaningfully expand the scope of federal habeas review because federal
courts already review whether the evidence at trial was legally sufficient
to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Factual innocence
claims, by contrast, would expand the federal courts' review of the facts
by including evidence that was subsequently learned of or obtained.
There may also be less of a concern with legal innocence claims
expanding the scope of federal habeas review because some kinds of
legal innocence claims (specifically those that argue the defendant was
convicted under an erroneous interpretation of a statute) can already be
raised and litigated as deprivations of the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial, or allegations of an unknowing, involuntary guilty plea.18 4
Of course, some factual innocence claims also wouldn't present a
significant drain on federal resources relative to existing habeas
litigation. DNA testing that identified someone else as the perpetrator,
for example, would not require an intense review and assessment of
evidence at trial. And factual innocence claims resemble sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claims to the extent they require courts to assess the
evidence on the record.18 5 Factual innocence claims, like legal innocence
claims, will raise the resource-based critique of federal habeas litigation
to varying degrees, although legal innocence claims may do so less
frequently.
Second, some legal innocence claims, if successful, would not result
in subsequent proceedings. 8 6 Legal innocence claims that depend on
constitutional immunity do not result in a new trial. If the defendant's
conduct is constitutionally protected, the state cannot retry the defendant
at all. The same is true for legal innocence claims that result where the
183 Cf. Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 246-47 (1986) (holding that conviction vacated
on double jeopardy grounds can be "reduced to a conviction for a lesser included offense
which is not jeopardy barred").
184 See supra text accompanying notes 147-149.
185 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (framing the issue as whether "after
viewing the evidence [at trial] in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt").
186 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993) (expressing concern that, if
successful, a factual innocence claim "would in effect require the State to retry petitioner 10
years after his first trial" with attending problems of evidentiary decay).
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statute of conviction, as written, is unconstitutional. If the statute was
unlawfully written or enacted and a court invalidates it, the defendant
cannot be retried under that statute. Nor can the defendant be retried
under a subsequently enacted statute as the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits states from enacting statutes that criminalize or penalize
conduct that occurred before the statute's enactment. 187
For similar reasons, legal innocence claims that result where the
statute, properly interpreted, does not apply to the defendant, may not
result in a retrial. The defendant cannot be retried under a statute that
was later rewritten in a way that might be applied to the defendant. A
court could determine whether the facts as they were revealed at trial
(or, more likely, a plea colloquy) fall within the scope of a criminal
prohibition, properly interpreted.18 8 Alternatively, a court could enter a
judgment of acquittal on the conviction on the criminal prohibition that
was narrowed, a judgment of conviction on a lesser-included prohibition
that reaches the defendant's conduct.'" Or a court could permit the
government to introduce additional evidence and retry the defendant
under the criminal prohibition, properly interpreted, or another
prohibition. 190 Moreover, the nature of relief in these cases of legal
innocence is fairly clear, at least relative to cases of factual innocence,
where the Court expressed concern about whether subsequent retrials
should be prohibited. 191
But again, some factual innocence claims will also not result in
retrials. Where subsequently discovered facts identify someone else as
187 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 538 (2013) (explaining relevant doctrines);
id. (noting that ex post facto clause prohibits ex post facto sentencing statutes and
punishments, not just offense definitions).
188 Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (finding that courts could conduct
harmless error analysis where an erroneous jury instruction omitted an element of the
offense).
189 See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306 (1996) (approvingly noting federal
appellate courts that "have uniformly concluded that they may direct the entry of judgment
for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds
that affect only the greater offense").
190 See infra Subsection III.A. 1.c (discussing how the remedy would work in cases of plea
bargains and offering modification to Bousley).
191 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403 (expressing concern about requiring a new trial ten years
after the first trial based on a claim of factual innocence).
Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas
the perpetrator, or conclusively exonerate the defendant, then no
duplicative retrial will occur.
Third, any relief in cases of legal innocence would not be duplicative
with a prior proceeding. Both Friendly and Bator were concerned with
criminal procedure rules, such as the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendments' procedural protections, that govern how a defendant's
trial proceeds.1 92 A violation of any of these provisions ordinarily results
in a retrial that would focus on the same question as the original trial-
whether the defendant committed the offense he was convicted of at his
first trial. Legal innocence claims that might result in subsequent
proceedings are likely those that contend the statute was incorrectly
interpreted in the original proceeding. But any subsequent proceeding
that might occur in those cases would focus on a different question than
whatever animated the original trial. For example, a state might attempt
to charge the defendant with violating another criminal statute if a court
concluded the statute under which the defendant was convicted did not
apply to him. That subsequent proceeding, while it might rely on facts
that could have become stale, would not merely be a reenactment of the
original proceeding and the kind of duplicative proceeding that Friendly,
Bator, and the Court singled out for particular criticism. 193
Finally, the various finality-related concerns with relitigation, which
range from deterrence, to rehabilitation, to repose, apply differently in
cases of legal innocence.1 9 4 As the previous section argued, these
societal interests do not justify punishing defendants who have not
committed an act the law has criminalized. If a defendant's conduct was
not covered by a statute, there is no underlying substantive criminal law,
with attendant substantive goals, to be furthered. If the substantive
criminal statute was unconstitutional, then the Court has already
determined that the underlying constitutional right outweighs any
deterrent or other interest that may be part of the criminal law. Legal
192 See Amsterdam, supra note 84, at 383 (identifying the concern as a "duplication of
judicial effort"); Bator, supra note 9, at 451 (referring to "repetition of inquiry" and
"redetermination of the merits"); Friendly, supra note 1, at 157 (criticizing rules that the
defendant "is entitled to repeat engagements directed to issues . . . even though his guilt is
patent.").
193 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (noting "the enormous burden that having to retry cases
based on often stale evidence would place on the States").
194 Anthony Amsterdam further parsed the finality interests that Bator invoked. See
Amsterdam, supra note 84, at 383-86.
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innocence challenges therefore do not undermine the substantive goals
of criminal law in the same way procedural challenges might.
The existing critiques of litigating factual innocence claims are both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive-not all factual innocence claims
will implicate them, and those that do will implicate them to varying
degrees. The same is true for legal innocence claims, although they may
be less likely than factual innocence claims to require the kind of fact-
intensive relitigation that is a concern with factual innocence claims.
2. Sentence Versus Offense
The relitigation critiques are also implicated to a lesser degree where
a defendant argues that he is legally innocent of a sentence, rather than
an offense. Sentence innocence claims do not require the same degree of
resource-intensive relitigation as offense innocence claims because the
defendant's guilt of the underlying offense does not have to be
redetermined or relitigated.1 95 For example, in the ACCA context, if a
defendant is legally innocent of an ACCA sentence, the defendant's
conviction of the underlying offense, Section 922(g) (unlawful
possession of a firearm) still stands. Any subsequent sentencing
proceeding that determines what sentence to impose for that offense
without the ACCA sentencing enhancement is therefore more limited in
nature, and thus less burdensome, than a subsequent relitigation of the
defendant's guilt. 19 6
Additionally, any resentencing proceeding would not be exclusively
focused on events that occurred in the past, and thus the concerns with
evidentiary decay and staleness are less potent in sentence innocence
cases than they are in offense innocence cases. Criminal trials rely on
factual determinations about what the defendant did or did not do at
some prior time in order to assess whether the defendant's conduct falls
within the scope of a criminal statute. Some sentencing eligibility
determinations may also turn on the defendant's prior conduct and
195 See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (reasoning that "the
cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the cost of a retrial" because "[a]
resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and requiring the attendance of
only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel"); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to
Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 79, 146 (2012); and
id. at 149.
196 See Garret, Accuracy in Sentencing, supra note 110, at 543 (discussing the flexibility of
miscarriage of justice exceptions and the view that the burden of this exception is not great).
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events that are contemporaneous to the commission of the offense. But
not all of them do. As the ACCA case illustrates, the sentencing
enhancement turns on legal characterizations about the defendant's prior
convictions. Even where sentencing eligibility turns on the defendant's
prior conduct, the ultimate sentencing decision also incorporates an
assessment about the defendant's character and likelihood of
reoffending, both of which are determinations that would not be
undermined by the passage of time. 197
Finally, several of the finality-related concerns such as deterrence,
rehabilitation, and repose, are implicated to a lesser degree where a
defendant is innocent of his sentence, rather than his offense.198 The
remedy in sentence innocence cases is not overturning a conviction, and
thus sentence innocence cases do not forego the possibility of using
criminal law as a deterrent or means of retribution. 199 It was partially for
these reasons that the Court, in Molina-Martinez v. United States,
allowed defendants to more easily establish "plain error" for sentencing
errors rather than offense errors. 20 0 The Court observed that "[c]ourts
have ... mechanisms short of a full remand to determine whether a
district court ... would have imposed a different sentence absent the
error," and "a remand for resentencing . .. does not invoke the same
difficulties as a remand for retrial." 20 1
The resentencing litigation that occurred after the Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. United States is illustrative. After the Court
197 See generally Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for
Sentences, 4 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol'y 151, 166-73 (2014) (explaining that "there are
fundamental and essential conceptual differences between criminal trial[s) ... which are
designed ... to determine the binary question of a defendant's legal guilt, and criminal
sentencing proceedings, which . . . assess and prescribe a convicted offender's future and
fate").
198 See, e.g., United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying
on "the lesser costs to the systemic interests in finality where resentencing, as opposed to
retrial, is the appropriate remedy").
199 See Russell, supra note 195, at 82-83 (explaining that "[w]hen a mistake is made, the
court can then decide whether it actually impacted the ultimate sentence and correct the
sentence only in those instances").
200 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2016).
201 Id. at 1348-49 (quoting United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108, 117-18 (2d Cir.
2012)). Montgomery likewise suggested different ways states could reduce the burden of
potential resentencings in the wake of Montgomery. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (noting that states could remedy Miller "violation[s] by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole").
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invalidated the ACCA's residual clause, many federal prisoners filed
resentencing requests; the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
alone received "more than 1,800" requests for authorization to file
second or successive resentencing motions.202 The Eleventh Circuit is
unique in that the court requires panels to dispose of requests for
authorization within 30 days, 203 based only on the prisoner's filing (and
presentence reports or transcripts of sentencing proceedings).2 0 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled on thousands of authorization requests in the
wake of Johnson, which entailed deciding whether prisoners' predicate
convictions qualified as ACCA predicates under the still-valid, element-
of-force clause or enumerated offense clause.205 While the Eleventh
Circuit's approach to Johnson resentencings was imperfect, and fairly
subject to some criticism, 20 6 it underscores the judicial capacity to
process sentence innocence claims more efficiently than offense
innocence claims.
3. Reform Advantages
Making habeas law more uniformly receptive to legal innocence
claims may even serve some of the reform goals animating procedural
restrictions on federal habeas. The interest in judicial economy is often
cited in both the case law about habeas procedure and the scholarship
about habeas law.207 That interest would be furthered by a general rule
for legal innocence claims, and a commonly defined legal innocence
exception that allows petitioners to bypass the many different procedural
202 In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (Rosenbaum & Pryor, JJ., concurring
in result).
203 In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing In re Henry, 757 F.3d
1151, 1157 n.9 (11th Cir. 2014)); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Martin, J., concurring in result) (identifying this as a difference between the Eleventh
Circuit and other courts of appeals).
204 In re Clayton, 829 F.3d at 1264 (Martin, J., concurring in result) (quoting In re McCall,
826 F.3d 1308, 1312 n.7 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring)).
205 Leah M. Litman & Shakeer Rahman, What Lurks Below Beckles, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev.
555, 574-75, 575 n.100 (2017) (citing cases) (originally published online) (available at
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?referer-https://www.go
ogle.com/&httpsredir-1 &article=1268&context-nulr [https://perma.cc/UBZ5-6RLA]).
206 See In re Clayton, 829 F.3d at 1263-67 (Martin, J., concurring in result) (criticizing
Eleventh Circuit approach); Litman & Rahman, supra note 205, at 572-81 (same).
207 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-92 (1991); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-61 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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restrictions to habeas review.20 8 If legal innocence functioned as a means
of bypassing the various procedural restrictions, a determination about
whether a petitioner is legally innocent would save courts from
performing the many different inquiries that are now required by
retroactivity, procedural default, the statute of limitations, exhaustion,
and other restrictions on habeas review.2 09 The Court has previously
suggested that adopting uniform exceptions to procedural restrictions on
habeas furthers the goals of habeas review. Before the AEDPA enacted
restrictions on successive petitions, the Court elected to import the cause
and prejudice, and miscarriage of justice exceptions to procedural
default to cases of successive petitions. The Court explained that
"[c]onsiderations of certainty and stability" supported doing so, because
the standard was "defined in the case law" and thus would be "familiar
to federal courts."210
Adopting a uniform legal innocence standard for the various
procedural restrictions on federal habeas serves other purposes as well.
Streamlining procedural rules may beneficially affect habeas litigants,
who are primarily pro se. 2 1 1 Adopting a common, uniform account
across different procedural domains would make the process of habeas
litigation less unwieldy and difficult for habeas petitioners.212
208 It may mean that innocence should not be the "last resort" exception that courts could
evaluate only once they have exhausted other potential exceptions to procedural restrictions.
Cf. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004) (holding instead that federal courts may
only inquire into whether a petitioner is actually innocent after concluding the petitioner had
no other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default, and no non-defaulted claims
warranting comparable relief).
209 See Blume et al., supra note 175, at 465-75 (identifying various procedural inquiries as
a resource drain on federal courts); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's
Habeas Reform, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 485, 541-43 (1995) (same).
210 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 495-96. For additional benefits of importing one area of the
law into another, see, for example, Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional
Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 459, 484-94 (2010).
211 See Blume et al., supra note 175, at 445 (discussing the difficulties of collateral
challenges for pro se litigants).
212 Converging (i.e., making uniform) different remedial standards can be a mechanism to
limit remedies. See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 Calif.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 20-32) (on file with author). But that would not
be the case here, where the restrictions would be leveled up, instead of leveled down.
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III. REALIZING LEGAL INNOCENCE
This Part builds on the project of the prior section by outlining what
the law of federal habeas would look like if federal habeas was, in fact,
committed to remedying claims of legal innocence. But an innocence-
oriented law of federal habeas does not have to be left to the
imagination. As this Part shows, doctrinal tools are already available for
judges and litigants to make federal habeas more accommodating of
legal innocence claims. These doctrines can fairly be read to make the
federal habeas law we already have more amenable to claims of legal
innocence. To the extent there are statutory barriers-and judicial
decisions interpreting those statutory barriers to bar claims of
innocence-this Part re-examines the interpretation of those barriers to
ascertain which ones are actual impediments to litigating innocence
claims.
Much of the scholarship on reforming habeas has focused on
legislative fixes to the current system. Repealing the AEDPA and
replacing it with something that is rational and fair would certainly be a
welcome development, and the ability to rely on existing habeas law to
address legal innocence claims is not a reason to forego that possibility.
But Congress's failure to revisit the AEDPA should not preclude courts
and litigants from using existing tools to make federal habeas more
amenable to claims of innocence, including claims of legal innocence.
The Supreme Court has shown that it is receptive to many different
kinds of legal innocence-innocence resulting from decisions of
statutory interpretation, or innocence of noncapital sentences-and the
doctrine should follow suit.
Bringing legal innocence claims into the innocence fold may bring
attention to certain kinds of innocence that scholars may wish to
incorporate into innocence-oriented reform proposals. Of the legislative
reform proposals, only one (King and Hoffman's) mentioned some of
the kinds of claims that give rise to legal innocence, such as where a
new substantive rule "place[s] certain conduct totally beyond the bounds
of punishable behavior." 2 13 King and Hoffman proposed a statutory
amendment allowing federal prisoners to obtain review of whether he
213 See King & Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 4, at 93;
Hoffman & King, Rethinking the Federal Role, supra note 41, at 820. King & Hoffmann
might expand their definition of retroactive rules that may be raised in federal habeas expand
in light of recent cases like Welch or Montgomery.
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"was convicted for conduct that was never covered by the federal statute
defining his offense."214
But by not framing these kinds of claims in terms of innocence, their
proposal relies on the hope that some future Congress will enact a
modified federal habeas statute that makes federal habeas relief
available to legally innocent prisoners. If claims based on decisions of
statutory interpretation, or claims based on new, retroactive
constitutional rules are not conceived of as claims of innocence, then
Congress must adjust many different statutory provisions and judicial
doctrines-procedural default, statute of limitations, exhaustion,
successive petitions, retroactivity, evidentiary hearings, mandate recalls,
how claims are reviewed on the merits-that could bar relief on those
claims. If these claims are instead treated as innocence claims, that is
less of an issue because there are already exceptions to many of these
procedural hurdles for claims of innocence. What is needed is a
recognition that the Supreme Court has started treating legal innocence
claims as claims of innocence. Additionally, because many of the
procedural rules that might bar relief are judge-made doctrines, such as
procedural default or retroactivity, any legislative proposal may require
some doctrinal fixes anyway. Recognizing legal innocence claims as
claims of innocence may also justifiably expand the scope of federal
habeas review beyond King and Hoffman's proposal. King and Hoffman
would allow federal, but not state, prisoners to argue in federal habeas
that they were convicted of conduct that was not criminal under the
statute. 215 But if innocence includes being convicted of an act that the
law did not make criminal, or being given a sentence in excess of what
the statutes authorized, then state and federal prisoners may have access
to federal habeas relief on that ground. Even if those kinds of legal
innocence do not create a cognizable, freestanding ground for habeas
relief, conceptualizing them in terms of innocence would at least allow
state prisoners to have their other, independent federal-law claims
adjudicated because they would be "innocent," thus excusing them from
whatever procedural impediment would otherwise preclude review of
those claims.
214 King & Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 4, at 114.
2 15 Id. at 113-14.
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Section III.A discusses the gateway restrictions on federal habeas
relief, and Section II.B discusses the scope of federal habeas review of
the merits.
A. "Procedure ": Gateways & Bypasses
1. Procedural Default
The actual innocence exception to procedural default should include
legal innocence in addition to factual innocence. In other contexts, the
Court has already concluded that the interests safeguarded by procedural
default are outweighed by the interest mi affording habeas relief to
legally innocent defendants. And the Court's procedural default cases
strongly suggest that legal innocence is a kind of actual innocence. This
Part also outlines how the legal innocence inquiry should work in cases
where a defendant argues he was convicted or sentenced under a statute
that does not apply to him.
a. Balancing the Interests
The Court has already recognized and described legal innocence as a
species of actual innocence. More importantly, the contexts in which it
did so, retroactivity and the statute of limitations, are procedural
limitations on federal habeas that are designed to protect many of the
same interests that animate procedural default. Therefore, the Court has
already balanced the relevant, competing interests, and concluded they
are outweighed by the interest in ensuring the availability of federal
habeas relief in cases of legal innocence. Procedural default doctrine, the
Court has explained, furthers the interest in finality ("insuring that there
will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to
litigation"),2 16 as well as various interests associated with federalism.
The federalism-related interests include "the important interests served
by state procedural rules"; "the States' sovereign power to punish
offenders"; 217 and desire to channel the "adjudication of [defendants']
2 16 E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (quoting Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 24--25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
217 Id. at 748-49.
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constitutional claims in state court" and validate states "good-faith
attempts to honor constitutional rights."2 18
But finality and federalism are the same interests that are safeguarded
by the doctrine barring retroactive application of new constitutional
rules. In that context, the Court has concluded that the interests in
ensuring the availability of federal habeas relief in cases of legal
innocence outweighs the interests in finality and federalism. The bar
against retroactive application accommodates "considerations of
finality." 219 The finality concern "has no application in the realm of
substantive rules," 220 which include rules precipitating various kinds of
legal innocence, such as where Congress did not, but could,
constitutionally criminalize certain conduct or impose a noncapital
sentence; 221 and where the defendant's conduct does not fall within the
scope of the criminal statute.222 In these cases, "[t]here is little societal
interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it
ought properly never to repose."2 23
"[T]he general rule of nonretroactivity" is also based in part on
"[fjederalism and comity considerations," 224 which the Court has
concluded are outweighed by the interest in making federal habeas relief
available for defendants who are legally innocent. The particularized
federalism interests that are purportedly protected by procedural default
doctrine either have no application in cases involving legal innocence or
are insufficiently implicated in cases of legal innocence to outweigh the
interest in affording federal habeas relief to legally innocent defendants.
One federalism interest purportedly protected by procedural default
218 Id. at 748; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(explaining procedural default as accommodating "interests of comity and finality").
219 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
220 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016)
221 See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1266-68 (2016) (decision invalidating
statutory sentencing enhancement on vagueness grounds is retroactive).
222 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (decision narrowing scope of
criminal statute by interpreting its term is retroactive).
223 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (2016) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); Welch, 136
S. Ct. at 1266 (same).
224 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.




doctrine is "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders." 2 25 But that
interest is not implicated in cases of legal innocence. If the defendant is
legally innocent because the Constitution prohibits states from
criminalizing his conduct, imposing a particular sentence on him, or
imposing a particular sentence in the way it did, the state has no
"sovereign" power to override this prohibition. And if the defendant's
conduct falls outside the scope of a criminal statute, or the defendant
received a punishment that exceeded what was authorized by statute, the
state lawmaking process has not exercised its sovereign power to punish
that defendant.
Procedural default doctrine also respects the federalism-related
"important interests served by state procedural rules,"226 as well as the
desire to channel the "adjudication of [defendants'] constitutional claims
in state court," and thereby validate states' "good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights." 2 27 The latter interest is one of the animating
reasons behind retroactivity doctrine-to validate "reasonable, good-
faith interpretations" of constitutional precedents. 228 And the Court has
already concluded that interest is outweighed by the interest in affording
federal habeas relief to legally innocent defendants, at least where their
non-capital sentence violates the Constitution.
b. Doctrinal Signals
The Court's procedural default cases strongly signal that legal
innocence should be treated as actual innocence. Bousley v. United
States held that a decision narrowing the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms was retroactive. 2 2 9 After rejecting the government's
argument that the decision was not retroactive, Bousley proceeded to
address the issue of whether the defendant had procedurally defaulted on
the claim that the statute did not apply to him. Bousley did so by
invoking Smith v. Murray's "actual innocence" exception to procedural
default, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
225 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991).
226 Id. at 749.
227 Id. at 748; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(explaining procedural default as accommodating "interests of comity and finality").
228 Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 236 (1992) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
414 (1990)).
22 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
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habeas petitioner was actually innocent. 23 0 Bousley thus recognized that
legal innocence, if the defendant's conduct did not fall within the scope
of the relevant criminal statute, would constitute cause for procedural
default. The Court has also understood Bousley in this way, recently
characterizing it as holding "that actual innocence may overcome a
prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection on direct review." 231
Moreover, three Justices in Dretke v. Haley, including Justice Kennedy,
signaled their willingness to hold that a habeas petitioner can be actually
innocent of a noncapital sentencing enhancement that was mistakenly
applied to the petitioner.2 32 In Dretke, the sentencing enhancement for
petty theft applied only where a defendant committed an offense after
his prior conviction became final, but the defendant in that case
committed the offense three days before his conviction became final.233
To be sure, the Court in Sawyer v. Whitley stated that "the miscarriage
of justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal
innocence."234 But in the case the Court was referring to, Murray, the
potential error was that a prosecutor elicited testimony from a mental
health professional concerning a prior interview with the defendant-a
classic kind of procedural error regarding the type of evidence that the
government may use.235 Murray did not even categorically foreclose
consideration of the defendant's claim; rather, Murray explained that
there was no allegation that the testimony "was false or in any way
misleading," and that the evidence could not have affected "the ultimate
230 Id. at 623.
231 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393 (2013); see also Welch v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1257, 1267 (2016) ("Bousley thus contradicts the contention that the Teague inquiry
turns only on whether the decision at issue holds that Congress lacks some substantive
power.").
232 See 541 U.S. 386, 389-90 (2004) (defendant was sentenced under recidivist provision
applicable where the defendant committed an offense after the previous conviction became
final, but defendant committed second offense three days before conviction became final);
id. at 396-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter & Kennedy, JJ.) (stating that under
those circumstances "there is no factual basis for respondent's conviction as a habitual
offender"); id. at 399 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that defendant was "sentenced for
a crime he did not commit").
233 Id. at 389-90.
234 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992).
235 Id. at 339-40 (characterizing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986)); Murray, 477 U.S.
at 528-29.
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question whether in fact petitioner constituted a continuing threat to
society." 2 3 6
The other early cases on procedural default also do not foreclose the
actual innocence exception to procedural default extending to legal
innocence claims. United States v. Addonizio held that the defendant's
claim that the United States Parole Commission's policies prolonged the
defendant's imprisonment will not "support a collateral attack on the
original sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."237 Addonizio addressed only
whether that claim was cognizable in a Section 2255 proceeding,238 and
specifically whether the claim fell within Section 2255's authorization
for federal courts to entertain claims that the court "was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack." 23 9 Section 2255 also authorizes courts to entertain claims where
"the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States,, 24 0  and Addonizio recognized that "the
writ ... encompass[es] claims of constitutional error." 24 1 Addonizio
does, however, speak to what a miscarriage of justice means because
Section 2255 listed "error[s] of law" 2 42 as another ground for relief, and
Addonizio tied whether an error of law was cognizable in federal habeas
to whether there was "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice."243 Addonizio therefore might suggest
that certain kinds of errors of law do not result in an actually innocent
person, but only if the case was using "miscarriage of justice" in the
same way the procedural default cases do. Even then, however,
236 Murray, 477 U.S. at 538. Additionally, the error in Smith concerned whether a piece of
evidence should have been considered by a trier of fact in making a determination that did
not turn exclusively on that evidence. Cases of legal innocence, however, involve the
mistaken application of a substantive criminal statute or penalty provision to a defendant;
these errors are sufficient to remove the very basis for convicting, sentencing, or detaining
the defendant.
237 442 U.S. 178, 179 (1979).
238 Id. at 184 ("We decide only the jurisdictional issue.").
239 Id. at 185 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976)).
24028 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
241 Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185.
242 Id.
243 Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). The Court later applied
this same standard to cases involving state prisoners with an error of federal statutory law.
See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353-55 (1994).
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Addonizio distinguished a prior case, Davis v. United States,2" where "a
change in the substantive law that established that the conduct for which
the petitioner had been convicted and sentenced was lawful." 2 45
Addonizio explained that the kind of error in Davis constituted a
miscarriage of justice because "the conviction and sentence were no
longer lawful,"2 46 whereas a change in the parole commission policies
"affected the way in which the court's judgment and sentence would be
performed but it did not affect the lawfulness of the judgment itself-
then or now." 247
Finally, the courts of appeals that have held that petitioners could not
be actually innocent of noncapital sentences relied on reasoning that is
either no longer tenable in light of subsequent cases, or is not
persuasive. 2 48 For example, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits reasoned that
because the Supreme Court had said that actual innocence "[i]n the
context of a noncapital case, the concept of 'actual innocence' is easy to
grasp,"249 the "most natural inference" was that the Court "simply
mean[t] the person didn't commit the crime." 25 0 But the Supreme Court
has recognized that one way a habeas petitioner may not commit the
crime is if the petitioner's conduct falls outside the scope of the criminal
251 25th
prohibition, or outside the scope of the penalty-imposing provision.2 52
244 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
245 Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186-87.
246 Id. at 187.
247 Id.; see also Davis, 417 U.S. at 346 ("If this contention is well taken, then Davis'
conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. There can be
no room for doubt that such a circumstance 'inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice."') (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 429). The kind of error that occurred in Hill, and that
did not constitute a miscarriage of justice, was similar to that seen in Addonizio. In Hill, the
defendant "was not asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf' at
sentencing which violated the federal rules of criminal procedure. See Hill, 368 U.S. at 425.
These early formulations of miscarriage of justice, which focus on whether the defendant
was convicted of "an act that the law does not make criminal," are similar to Teague's initial
formulation of substantive rules. See supra Section I.B. In any case, the statements are not an
exhaustive list or necessary criteria of legal innocence; merely a list of sufficient conditions
to establish legal innocence.
248 Th1 Court granted certiorari in Dretke v. Haley to decide whether the actual innocence
exception applies where a habeas petitioner is actually innocent of a noncapital sentence but
declined to answer that question. 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004).
249 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992).
250 Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993).
251 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24.
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The Eighth Circuit also noted that Judge Friendly proposed an innocence
model of federal habeas to restrict, rather than expand, federal habeas.2 53
But that fails to answer what kinds of innocence should matter in an
innocence-oriented account of federal habeas. In any case, as Judge
Friendly explained why innocence, rather than all constitutional errors,
should matter in federal habeas, he specifically noted that "[a] judge's
overly broad construction of a penal statute," which results in a "legally
innocent" defendant, "can be much more harmful to a defendant" than
many constitutional errors.254 Appeals courts that declined to recognize a
legal innocence exception to procedural default also worried that
petitioners could turn actual innocence claims "into a complaint that the
relevant facts did not support a conviction." 255 But courts are already
making that determination because factual innocence currently functions
as an exception to procedural default. Lastly, some courts of appeal
rejected the idea that a petitioner could be actually innocent of a
noncapital sentence on the ground that conditions establishing the
defendant's eligibility for a higher, noncapital sentence were not
"elements of the offense." 25 6 But the Supreme Court has since rejected
that idea and held that both a statutory condition that exposes the
defendant to a higher statutory maximum sentence,25 7 and a statutory
condition that exposes the defendant to a higher statutory minimum
sentence,2 5 8 are elements of the offense for Sixth Amendment
purposes.25 9
252 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
253 Embrey, 131 F.3d at 741 (citing Friendly, supra note 1).
254 Friendly, supra note 1, at 157.
2 5 5 Embrey, 131 F.3d at 741.
256 Gibbs v. United States, 655 F.3d 473, 478-79 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding a petitioner
could not actually be innocent of a Guidelines sentence within the statutory maximum);
United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993).
257 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
258 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
259 There is an exception, for Sixth Amendment purposes, for conditions predicated on the
defendant's prior convictions. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). But
in the retroactivity context, the Court recognized a prisoner could be actually legally
innocent based on the misapplication of a statutory condition tied to the defendant's criminal
history. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-68 (2016).
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c. Implementation
In Bousley, the Court attempted to craft procedural default doctrine to
make the kind of legal innocence claim at issue in the case (that the
defendant was convicted under a statute that did not make the
defendant's conduct criminal) more akin to factual innocence. After the
defendant pled guilty to using a firearm in connection with a drug
trafficking offense, the Supreme Court held in Bailey v. United States
that using a firearm required the government to prove active
employment of the firearm.2 60 But at the defendant's plea colloquy, he
admitted only to storing the gun in proximity to drugs. 26 1 Bousley
explained that because "'actual innocence' means factual innocence, not
mere legal insufficiency," "the Government is not limited to the existing
record to rebut" the petitioner's showing that he did not commit the act
prohibited by the statute. 2 62 "Rather," the Court wrote, "the Government
should be permitted to present any admissible evidence of petitioner's
guilt even if that evidence was not presented during petitioner's plea
colloquy and would not normally have been offered before" the decision
interpreting the statute to mean active employment of a firearm.263
While Bousley's directive attempted to make legal innocence claims
arising from decisions of statutory interpretation more similar to factual
innocence claims, it also made the claims more administratively
burdensome because it contemplated the collection of additional facts
and evidence about events that occurred long ago. That may be a reason
to reconsider the Bousley inquiry in the future, and to limit it to evidence
that is already part of the record, particularly if resource constraints are a
primary misgiving with litigating legal innocence claims. Limiting
review has the potential to decrease prosecutors' incentives to
overcharge, by encouraging them 1) to select charges and agree to plea
bargains that are safer bets, rather than reaches, and 2) to enter plea
deals under conservative interpretations of criminal statutes. That has the
potential to decrease incentives to overcharge, and encourage
prosecutors to enter plea deals to criminal statutes that are interpreted
conservatively as well as select charges and agree to plea bargains that
260 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 616.
261 Id. at 617.
262 Id. at 623-24.
263 Id. at 624.
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are safer bets, rather than reaches. 2 M Whether that aspect of Bousley
should be changed is a conclusion beyond the scope of this Article, but
warrants further consideration.2 65
2. Statute ofLimitations
The rule that actual innocence excuses the statute of limitations
should be understood to encompass cases of legal innocence. The case
that recognized the innocence exception to the statute of limitations,
McQuiggin v. Perkins, referred to the exception in terms of "actual
innocence," as opposed to factual innocence.2 66 Additionally, the same
considerations that motivate the statute of limitations, "federalism and
comity," are the same considerations that the court has already
concluded do not outweigh the injustice that results from the continued
detention of a legally innocent defendant. 2 67 The Court has recognized
that the habeas rules treat the statute of limitations as "akin" to defenses
such as "procedural default, and nonretroactivity." 2 68 Like those
defenses, the statute of limitations, too, sounds in "considerations of
comity, finality, and the expeditious handling of habeas proceedings."26 9
The Court has already explicitly held those considerations yield to the
interest in affording habeas relief to legally innocent defendants in the
context of retroactivity. The previous section showed why the same is
true for another defense, procedural default, because it too is grounded
in considerations of comity, federalism and finality. The same should be
true for the statute of limitations.
McQuiggin, however, did occasionally refer to innocence in terms of
new facts or evidence establishing the defendant's innocence. But when
it did so, the Court was addressing the State's argument that an actual
innocence exception improperly rendered superfluous various AEDPA
provisions, such as Section 2244(d)(1)(D), which starts the statute of
264 Cf., e.g., Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 701 (2014) (documenting
phenomenon of overcharging).
265 There are countervailing interests, such as fairness to the state in allowing the state to
introduce evidence it previously thought unnecessary.
266 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 398 (2013).
267 Id. at 393-94.
268 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 208-09 (2006) (holding that district courts may
raise the statute of limitations defense sua sponte, as with the other defenses listed).
269 Ic at 208
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limitations on "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence." 2 70 Rejecting that argument, McQuiggin explained that
Section 2244(d)(1)(D) is both "more stringent (because it requires
diligence)" and "less stringent (because it requires no showing of
innocence)."2 7 1 In explaining the latter difference, McQuiggin
maintained that the miscarriage of justice exception "applies to a
severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows 'it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted' the
petitioner.272 McQuiggin elsewhere characterized legal innocence as a
kind of actual innocence, characterizing Bousley, which concerned a
decision of statutory interpretation that resulted in the petitioner's
conduct no longer being criminalized, as an "actual innocence" case.273
McQuiggin depicted Bousley as holding that "actual innocence may
overcome a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection on direct
review."274 Moreover, were actual innocence to include claims of legal
innocence, that would be another reason why a miscarriage of justice
exception to the statute of limitations does not render superfluous
Section 2244(d)(1)(D), which concerns new evidence, rather than new
constitutional rights or decisions of statutory interpretation.
But if actual innocence did include claims of legal innocence, that
could render another provision of the AEDPA superfluous-specifically,
the provision that triggers the statute of limitations on "the date on
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been ... made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review. 275 That provision is a specific trigger for
legal innocence claims that result from the recognition of a new,
substantive rule of constitutional law that invalidates the statute under
which the defendant was convicted or sentenced. But that provision
would not be rendered superfluous even if the statute of limitations were
excused in cases of legal innocence. Like the provision the Court
examined in McQuiggin, the provision here is both narrower and
270 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012).
271 McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 395.
272 Id. at 394-95 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)).
273 Id. at 393.
274 Id.
275 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C), 2255(f)(3) (2012).
2018] 475
Virginia Law Review
broader than an equitable exception for legal innocence. The provision is
narrower because it applies only to "constitutional rights," but as
Bousley illustrates, legal innocence can also arise from decisions of
statutory interpretation. Moreover, the provision applies only to rights
"made retroactively applicable"; depending on how that phrase is
interpreted,2 76 the provision may also be narrower than a legal innocence
exception. The provision is also broader than cases of legal innocence
because it is triggered by all constitutional rights made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review, not all of which involve legal
innocence. In addition to substantive rules, new watershed rules of
criminal procedure are retroactive in cases on collateral review; and new
watershed rules of criminal procedure do not necessarily result in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant. Although these new rules
of criminal procedure "improve the pre-existing fact-finding
procedures,"27 7 the violation of a watershed rule of criminal procedure
may not have resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent
in any particular case.
3. Exhaustion
Although prisoners convicted in state court generally may not have
their federal habeas petitions adjudicated if a prisoner has not exhausted
the remedies available in state court,278 there may be circumstances
where federal courts should adjudicate unexhausted claims that are
raised by legally innocent prisoners.
The AEDPA only requires petitioners to exhaust "available"
remedies, 2 7 9 and federal courts may consider unexhausted claims where
"there is an absence of available State corrective process."28 0 While
276 See infra text accompanying notes 299-315 (explaining Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656
(2001)).
277 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
278 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012). The "exhaustion" requirement for federal prisoners
necessitates that a prisoner first use the remedy provided for by § 2255 before resorting to
the general habeas corpus statute in § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Section 2255(e) is
discussed infra Subsection III.A.5.
27928 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012).
280 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). These provisions are part of why it matters less
that the statute allows federal courts to deny unexhausted claims on the merits. See id. at
2254(b)(2).
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many states allow petitioners to raise legal innocence claims that arise
where the petitioner has been convicted of conduct the law does not
make criminal, or received a sentence that exceeds the amount provided
for by statute,281 not all states do. At least four states, Iowa, Nevada,
New York, and Florida, maintain that certain judicial interpretations of
state statutes do not apply retroactively, and petitioners therefore cannot
raise a claim in post-conviction proceedings that the statute under which
they were convicted has been interpreted not to apply to them.2 82 If a
state does not allow a petitioner to raise a claim that he was convicted of
conduct the law does not make criminal, then there are no available
remedies for the petitioner's legal innocence claim, and a federal court
may adjudicate that claim.283 Even if a state generally allows petitioners
to raise legal innocence claims in state post-conviction proceedings, the
petitioner may be barred from doing so because of procedural doctrines,
such as the statute of limitations,28 4 or state procedural default
281 See, e.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1; Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 464 (Ala. Crim. App.
2012); State v. Slemmer, 823 P.2d 41, 49 (Ariz. 1991) (adopting federal retroactivity
standards); People v. Mutch, 482 P.2d 633, 637-38 (Cal. 1971) (state judicial constructions
of state statutes are retroactive); In re Joe, No. B275593, 2016 WL 4921420, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 15, 2016) (summarizing that judicial constructions of statutes are retroactive);
Chao v. State, 931 A.2d 1000, 1000 (Del. 2007) (state decisions of statutory interpretation
retroactive, but invoking a statute of limitations bar); Luke v. Battle, 565 S.E.2d 816, 820
(Ga. 2002); People v. Reed, 25 N.E.3d 10, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Jacobs v. State, 835
N.E.2d 485, 487-88 (Ind. 2005); Thornton v. Denney, 467 S.W.3d 292, 299 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015); Kendrick v. Dist. Att'y of Phila. Cty., 916 A.2d 529, 538-39 (Pa. 2007); In re Hinton,
100 P.3d 801, 804 (Wash. 2004).
282 See Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Iowa 2009) (refusing to apply state
interpretation of sentencing statute retroactively); Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521, 523 (Nev.
2003) (same); People v. Diguglielmo, 952 N.E.2d 1068, 1068 (N.Y. 2011) (same); State v.
Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 528 (Fla. 2005) (only decisions of state statutory interpretation that
are constitutional in nature applied retroactively). Kansas courts have suggested some
decisions of statutory interpretation would not be applied retroactively. See Easterwood v.
State, 44 P.3d 1209, 1220-23 (Kan. 2002).
283 Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 2004) (where state did not
afford means to review prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in revocation of earned
good behavior credits, state remedies were not available). If resorting to state court would be
futile, then the unexhausted claims are treated as procedurally defaulted ones where
innocence would be an exception. See, e.g., Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir.
2000) (treating as procedurally defaulted claims that would be futile to raise in a state
proceeding).
2
4 Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 3585 EDA 2015, 2016 WL 6311755, at *4 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Oct. 28, 2016).
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doctrines.285 Under those circumstances, resort to state court would be
futile and the petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.286
However, even if there are available remedies for a petitioner's legal
innocence claim such that a habeas petitioner could air that claim in state
court, a federal court may be able to adjudicate an unexhausted claim in
some circumstances. The AEDPA does not require courts to dismiss
unexhausted claims or petitions where state remedies would be
"ineffective to protect the rights" of the petitioner, thus allowing a
federal court to adjudicate the merits of a petitioner's claim. 28 7 That May
be the truth in some cases where a habeas petitioner is legally innocent.
In cases of legal innocence, there is no statute that authorizes the
petitioner's detention at all, or there is no statute that authorizes the
petitioner's continued detention and sentence. Because there is no basis
to detain a legally innocent petitioner, dismissing a legally innocent
defendant's federal habeas petition only aggravates the relevant harm-
the continued detention of someone whom a state has no basis to detain.
That makes a legal innocence claim different than many criminal
procedure claims that concern the process the state used to detain a
prisoner because a legal innocence claim extinguishes the state's
detention authority itself. Dismissing an unexhausted petition or a mixed
petition would only prolong the relevant harm, which is the
unauthorized detention, and a subsequent trial or sentencing could not
remedy the harm to the habeas petitioner. If the petitioner is legally
innocent because the state cannot criminalize his conduct, or impose a
sentence on him, it may not do so on retrial. And if the state amended a
statute to apply to the petitioner, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits a
285 Easterwood v. State, 44 P.3d 1209, 1211 (Kan. 2002); State v. Harwood, 746 S.E.2d
445, 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
286 See supra Subsection III.A.1.
287 This argument was contemplated and apparently endorsed by three Justices in Dretke.
See infra note 289. It weaves together two strands of existing case law. The first are the
cases that recognize an extended delay in state procedures may make those procedures
ineffective or unavailable. See, e.g., Burks v. Thaler, 421 F. App'x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (seven years); Lines, 208 F.3d at 163-64; Dickey v. Hargett, 979 F.2d 1533,
1533 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (1 year); Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 247 (3d Cir.
1991) (eleven years). The second are cases that tie whether state remedies are ineffective to
the nature of the petitioner's claim. See, e.g., Bies v. Bagley, 519 F.3d 324, 330-31 (6th Cir.
2008), rev'd on other grounds by Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009); Jones v. Chappell, 31
F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev'd on other grounds by Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d
538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing on ground that claim was barred by Teague).
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state from applying it to the defendant-the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits legislatures from criminalizing conduct or imposing
punishments for conduct that was not criminalized pursuant to a lawful
statute at the time.288
Therefore, state corrective processes may be ineffective where they
would prolong the detention of a petitioner whose conduct was not
criminalized pursuant to a lawful statute. State corrective processes may
also be ineffective where they would result in the detention of a
petitioner beyond the period authorized by statute. In some cases of legal
innocence, a habeas petitioner's term of imprisonment will already
exceed the amount of time that was authorized by a lawfully written
provision. In other cases, the term of imprisonment may be near the
amount of time that was authorized by a lawfully written provision. In
these kinds of legal innocence cases, state corrective processes would
also aggravate the relevant harm, the continued detention of individuals
who there is no lawful basis to detain, or to continue to detain, and the
processes may therefore be ineffective to protect the rights of the habeas
petitioner. In part for these reasons, the Justices in Dretke, who signaled
their willingness to hold that a petitioner can be legally innocent of a
noncapital sentence, also stated they would not require some legally
innocent petitioners to pursue other avenues before federal habeas: as
they explained, "requir[ing] [the petitioner] to pursue other avenues for
comparable relief... needlessly postpones final adjudication .. . and
perversely prolongs the very injustice" petitioner suffered-
unauthorized incarceration.
There may, however, be circumstances where it nonetheless makes
sense to require petitioners to proceed in state court first, such as where
another provision of state law may continue to authorize the defendant's
sentence.2 90 For example, the statute at issue in Welch, the ACCA,
sentenced defendants convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm to a
288 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10; Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072,
2077-78 (2013); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
2
8
9Dretke, 541 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., dissenting); id. at 399
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For the reasons Justice STEVENS sets forth, the respondent
should be entitled to immediate relief."). Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 542-43 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing that exhaustion rules should depend on the nature of the
defendant's claim).
290 Exhaustion may also make sense if the government is allowed to supplement the trial
record to show that a defendant's conduct falls within the ambit of a statute as it has been
subsequently interpreted. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24; supra Subsection HI.A.1.
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mandatory minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment if those
defendants had three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or
serious drug offenses.29 ' The Court invalidated the provision of the
ACCA that defined a violent felony as a crime that "otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another." 2 92 But invalidating that provision did not do away with the rest
of the ACCA, and under the ACCA, defendants could still be subject to
a mandatory fifteen-year term if their prior convictions qualified as
serious drug offenses or violent felonies, as that term was defined
elsewhere in the ACCA. If a state argues that a defendant's sentence
remains valid because the defendant's detention is authorized under
other parts of the same statute, deciding whether that is true requires a
court to look to other provisions of state law. In those cases, an
exhaustion requirement would further a state's role in interpreting its
own laws. 2 93 The same may be the case where the statute under which
the petitioner has been convicted or sentenced has not yet been declared
invalid, and a petitioner is arguing that a state statute is invalid because
it is sufficiently similar to other statutes that have been declared invalid.
Whether exhaustion makes sense depends on how similar the statute is
to ones that have been declared invalid.
4. Evidentiary Hearings
While the restrictions on evidentiary hearings may pose significant
barriers for petitioners who maintain they are factually innocent of a
crime,294 they pose less of a barrier for petitioners who are legally
innocent of a crime. Petitioners who are legally innocent may not need
291 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015).
292 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
293 Where the statute under which the petitioner was convicted or sentenced has not yet
been interpreted to not reach the petitioner's conduct, an exhaustion requirement would
make sense to further a state's unique role in interpreting its own laws. Cf. R.R. Comm'n of
Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (abstaining from deciding federal issue to
allow state court to determine state law issue); Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention
and State Administrative Law From Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial
Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 859,
886-99 (1993) (describing doctrines vindicating state interest in interpreting state law).
294 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012). Section 2254(e)'s restrictions on evidentiary hearings
do not apply to federal prisoners, who can receive a hearing "[u]nless the motion and the
files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012).
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to rely on evidence aside from what is already in the state record-the
facts adduced at trial or a plea colloquy-to establish that a statute, as
subsequently interpreted, does not apply to them; or that the statute
under which the petitioner was convicted or sentenced is invalid. The
state may want an evidentiary hearing in order to introduce additional
evidence of a petitioner's guilt, or evidence that a petitioner is guilty
under the statute, as it was recently interpreted. But the state may seek
an evidentiary hearing because the restrictions on them assume that the
habeas petitioner is the one seeking the hearing 295 ; additionally, the state
can waive the argument that the statutory preconditions on evidentiary
hearings have not been satisfied.2 96
5. Successive Petitions
The AEDPA severely restricts prisoners' ability to file successive
post-conviction motions and may foreclose relief for some legally
innocent prisoners, including where a ruling has invalidated the statute
under which the prisoner was convicted. In order to file a successive
motion for post-conviction review,297 a prisoner must show that the "new
rule of constitutional law" on which he relies was "made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." 2 98 And in Tyler v.
Cain, the Supreme Court held that the Court can "make" a rule
retroactive only through "holdings" rather than dicta.2 99 Thus, a prisoner
can establish that a rule has been "made retroactive . .. by the Supreme
Court" by showing that "the Supreme Court h[eld] it to be retroactive,"
either by applying that rule to a case on collateral review, or issuing a
295 The next section discusses the additional argument that some legally innocent
petitioners may fall within one of the preconditions for granting an evidentiary hearing. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012).
296 Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that arguments are
subject to waiver unless they implicate courts' jurisdictions).
297 There are a variety of procedures a prisoner must follow to obtain authorization to file a
successive motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012).
298 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A); 2255(h)(2) (2012).
299 533 U.S. 656, 666 (2001). Interestingly, in Tyler v. Cain, the United States represented
that the Court need not adopt an expansive interpretation of "made" for purposes of Section
2244 in part "[b]ecause of the availability of the 'savings clause,' there is no concern that
federal prisoners who have a claim based on a new decision of this Court cutting back on the
sweep of a criminal statute will lack a remedy." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 20 n.9, Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (Mar. 2, 2001).
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series of decisions whose holdings make that rule retroactive. 30 As a
result, courts occasionally conclude that, even though a new rule is
retroactive, a prisoner cannot rely on that rule to bring a successive
motion because the Supreme Court has not yet made that rule
retroactive.3 0' Thus, even prisoners who are legally innocent because the
statute under which they were convicted or sentenced has been held
unconstitutional may not be able to bring a successive motion for post-
conviction review.
The statutory restrictions on successive motions may also preclude
relief for prisoners who are legally innocent because the statute under
which they were convicted or sentenced has since been interpreted not to
apply to them. The provisions authorizing successive motions allow
them only in cases involving new evidence, or cases featuring "new
rules of constitutional law," but a decision interpreting a federal or state
statute is a decision of statutory interpretation. The AEDPA provisions
thus do not appear to authorize successive motions for these prisoners
either.
This subsection discusses four possible avenues that might allow
legally innocent prisoners to file successive motions-the interpretation
of "made" under Sections 2244 and 2255; the interpretation of Section
2255(e), which provides a safety valve for federal prisoners; mandate
recalls; and extraordinary writs in the Supreme Court.302 The statutory
restrictions on successive motions pose the greatest challenge for
making federal habeas law available to legally innocent prisoners, and
more than one of these avenues may be necessary to afford federal
habeas relief to legally innocent prisoners.
300 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663; see Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v.
United States, 28 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 45, 48-49 (2015).
301 See, e.g., In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding Johnson had
not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court); In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th
Cir. 2015) (same); In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 989 (11th Cir. 2015) (same).
302 This section does not discuss Rule 60(b) motions, which ordinarily allow a petitioner to
seek relief from a final civil judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Gonzalez v. Crosby held that
60(b) motions are governed by the restrictions for successive motions where a motion
"contend[s] that a subsequent change in substantive law is a 'reason justifying relief."' 545
U.S. 524, 531 (2005).
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a. (Re)interpreting Sections 2244 and 2255
Some of the barriers to relief for legally innocent prisoners could be
removed if the provisions restricting successive post-conviction motions
made less of the distinction between new constitutional rules that are
retroactive and have been made retroactive, and new constitutional rules
that have been made retroactive by the Supreme Court.303 Although
Tyler indicated that "a new rule is not []made retroactive ... unless the
Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive,"3 04 it also said that "with the
right combination of holdings," the "Court can make a rule retroactive
over the course of two cases." 305 Moreover, in describing the kinds of
rules that have not been made retroactive, Tyler envisioned cases where
"[t]he Supreme Court ... merely establishes principles of retroactivity
and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts" or where
courts of appeals would have "to engage in the difficult legal analysis
that can be required to determine questions of retroactivity in the first
instance," rather than "simply rely[ing] on Supreme Court holdings."30 6
In Price v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit interpreted Tyler in a way that would significantly reduce the
barriers to habeas relief for legally innocent petitioners.3 0' Price recited
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Tyler,308 which had stated that "[i]t is
relatively easy to demonstrate" that a rule is retroactive for substantive
rules-the kind that fall within Teague's first exception.309 Justice
O'Connor, who had joined the majority opinion in Tyler, explained that
the Supreme Court had already held that new substantive rules should be
applied retroactively. Thus, "[w]hen the Court holds as a new rule in a
303 Given the simultaneous enactment of the exact same language in the two provisions, it
would be hard to interpret the two provisions differently. At least two commentators
identified constitutional concerns with the barriers to resentencing federal prisoners that they
argued were not present with regard to state prisoners. See Carlos M. Vazquez & Stephen I.
Viadeck, The Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 Va. L. Rev.
905, 941-51 (2017).
304 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663.
30s Id. at 666.
306 Id. at 663-64.
307 795 F.3d 731, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2015).
30s Id. at 734.
309 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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subsequent case" a substantive rule, "it necessarily follows that this
Court has 'made' that new rule retroactive.'"
31 0
One problem with this approach, however, is that it will not always be
clear what counts as a substantive rule. Teague originally stated that a
substantive rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe,"' 3 1 1 and Justice O'Connor pointed to that definition in
Tyler.312 But the Court's most recent retroactivity cases solidified
another definition of substantive rules that has emerged: a rule is
substantive if it "necessarily carries a significant risk that a
defendant ... faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him." 3 13 Included in that definition are rules that narrow the scope of a
federal criminal statute by interpreting the statute,3 14 and rules that hold
"the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a
certain penalty."3 15
The better question, then, may be whether the Supreme Court has
"made" a particular kind of rule substantive.3 16 Thus, for example, in
Welch, the Supreme Court made retroactive a rule that invalidated a
criminal statute that both imposed a mandatory minimum sentence and
altered the maximum sentence a defendant could otherwise receive. Any
subsequent rules that invalidate statutes that both fix mandatory
minimum sentences and raise a defendant's statutory maximum sentence
have thus been made retroactive. Less clear, however, is whether a rule
invalidating a statute that subjected a defendant to a minimum sentence
without altering the defendant's maximum sentence has been made a
substantive rule. In those kinds of cases, courts of appeals would
310 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
311 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part)).
312 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
313 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1266 (2016) (quoting
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620).
314 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616, 620-21.
31s Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
316 Although the more expansive reading might be justified in terms of constitutional
avoidance concerns in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery, see infra 321-
324, it would also do nothing for petitioners who are legally innocent as a result of a decision
of statutory interpretation, and it may also be more difficult to reconcile with Tyler.
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seemingly need to apply the principles of retroactivity the Supreme
Court has established rather than mechanically implement them.
Reinterpreting Sections 2244 and 2255 also may not help those
prisoners who are legally innocent as a result of a decision of statutory
interpretation, rather than constitutional interpretation. Although the
Supreme Court has said that decisions interpreting criminal statutes are
retroactive,3 17 the AEDPA permits successive motions only for new,
retroactive "rule[s] of constitutional law." 318
b. Interpreting section 2255(e)
One compelling way to close the gap for federal prisoners would be
via the savings clause of Section 2255. Section 2255(e) allows federal
prisoners to file petitions for habeas corpus under the general habeas
corpus statute that is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas petitions filed
under Section 2241 are not subject to the limitations contained in
Section 2255. Section 2255(e) allows federal prisoners "who [are]
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section" to file
habeas petitions under Section 2241 if "the remedy by [Section 2255]
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the]
detention."3 19 Several courts have interpreted the savings clause to allow
petitioners to raise the claim that, as a result of a subsequent decision of
statutory interpretation, they were wrongly convicted or sentenced.3 2 0
Section 2255(e) is, at a minimum, ambiguous. Section 2255(e) was
also enacted prior to the AEDPA's more specific limitations on
successive motions, including those applicable to federal prisoners.32 1
317 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616, 620-21.
318 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2255(h)(2) (2012).
3" 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
320 E.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (permitting
Bailey claim); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1997). Other courts of appeals
have interpreted the savings clause to allow petitioners to raise new constitutional claims that
are based on retroactive rules and were foreclosed by precedent at the time of the prisoner's
first petition. E.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001); In re
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610-11 (7th
Cir. 1998).
321 At the time, second or successive petitions were prohibited when a successive petition
constituted an abuse of the writ, such as when a petitioner "deliberately withholds" a ground
of relief "in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one . . . ." Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). The Court later held, prior to the AEDPA's enactment, that the
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However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana provides some basis for courts to interpret Section 2255(e) in
a way that avoids the constitutional concerns with an interpretation of
the provision that forecloses relief for claims that are based on
substantive rules.322 Montgomery held that the Constitution requires state
courts to give retroactive effect to substantive rules. The reason,
Montgomery explained, is because the nature of substantive rules
compels judges to award claims for relief based on those rules provided
the court has jurisdiction to do so:
A conviction or sentence imposed in violation of a substantive rule is
not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void. It follows,
as a general principle, that a court has no authority to leave in place a
conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of
whether the conviction or sentence became final before the rule was
announced.3 23
Professors Carlos Vasquez and Stephen Vladeck have argued that, in
light of Montgomery, the Constitution requires the availability of post-
conviction review for claims that raise substantive rules.32 4 But even if it
does not, Montgomery, at a minimum, indicates there would be
constitutional concerns with any interpretation of a statute that requires
courts to leave in place a conviction or sentence that was not authorized
pursuant to a valid statute, particularly for federal prisoners.
In addition to the constitutional concerns with interpreting Section
2255(e) to bar claims by persons who are mistakenly sentenced above
the statutory maximum for their offense, there are strong arguments for
why the text, history, and structure of the statute suggest federal
prisoners should be able to file habeas petitions in certain legal
innocence cases, including where a petitioner has a claim that she was
mistakenly convicted because of an error of statutory interpretation or a
claim that she was mistakenly sentenced above the statutory maximum
for her offense, again because of an error of statutory interpretation.3 25
procedural default exceptions apply to successive petitions. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 479 (1991).
322 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016).
323 Id.
324 Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 303, at 910.
325J outline some of those arguments in Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch And Johnson
Resentencing (This Is Not A Joke), 115 Mich. L. Rev. Online 67, 73-76 (2017).
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When Congress enacted Section 2255, its "purpose and effect ... was
not to restrict access to the writ [of habeas corpus] but to make post-
conviction proceedings more efficient." 32 6 Rather, Congress ensured that
prisoners can file Section 2255 motions in districts where they were
sentenced, rather than where they were detained.3 2 7 When Congress
originally enacted Section 2255 and also when it later enacted the
AEDPA, there was a long history of special solicitude for habeas
petitions that challenge the legality of the statute under which the
defendant was convicted or sentenced, and whether the defendant had
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment that was not lawfully
authorized by the statute of his conviction.3 28 The AEDPA partially
reflects that solicitude by authorizing successive motions that raise
claims based on new and retroactive rules of constitutional law.3 2 9 But
petitioners who are erroneously convicted or sentenced above the
statutory maximum because of an error of interpretation are similarly
situated to petitioners who were convicted or sentenced under an invalid
statute. The Court has explained that the relevant metric for whether the
Constitution requires courts to afford relief based on a particular rule
depends on "the function of the rule," meaning the rule's effects.330 And
the effects of decisions invalidating a statute or narrowing the statute by
interpreting its terms are the same: in both cases, no statute authorizes
all of these petitioners' detentions.331
326 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 775 (2008); H.R. Rep. No. 2646, at A172 (1946);
H.R. Rep. No. 808, at Al80 (1947).
327 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1952); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605,
609 (7th Cir. 2008).
328 In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1911); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 256, 258
(1894); In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 269-71 (1890); Ex parte Yarbrough (The Ku-Klux Cases),
110 U.S. 651, 654 (1884); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879); Litman,
Constitutional Significance, supra note 105.
329 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012).
330 See, e.g., Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729-32; Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257,
1265-6 (2016).
331 The United States, until recently, has argued that the savings clause allows prisoners
who were mistakenly convicted or sentenced above the statutory maximum because of an
error of statutory interpretation can file habeas petitions under the savings clause where
circuit precedent foreclosed their claim at the time. Based in part on the United States'
representation, the Court interpreted the limitations on successive petitions expansively. See
Reply Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant at 5, McCarthan v. Collins, No. 17-85 (U.S. Oct. 30,
2017).
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Section 2255(e)'s text also specifically contemplates authorizing a
habeas petition where "the court which sentenced [a prisoner] ... has
denied him relief' by "motion pursuant to this section." 332 That is,
Section 2255(e) contemplates authorizing a petitioner to file a habeas
petition where the prisoner previously litigated and lost a claim in a
previous proceeding under Section 2255, or where the restrictions on the
availability of post-conviction relief would prevent the petitioner from
obtaining relief.333 Otherwise, that portion of the savings clause would
be meaningless.3 34 And Section 2255(e)'s use of the word "remedy"
does not signify that it is irrelevant whether a prisoner is able to obtain
relief under Section 2255.335 Congress. frequently uses relief to signify
the result of a remedy; the two terms are not so distinct.336 Neither does
the word "test" imply a limitation on the kinds of claims that can be
brought under Section 2255 33 7-the statute authorizing writs of habeas
corpus for persons detained by Indian tribes allows the detainee "to test
the legality of his detention," and the Court has described this language
as a general grant of authority to issue writs.338
While courts could-and should-interpret Section 2255(e) to allow
federal prisoners to bring habeas petitions that raise substantive claims if
332 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
333 Id.
334 As noted supra, at the time Section 2255 was enacted, federal prisoners could raise a
claim, in successive petitions, that they were mistakenly convicted or sentenced because of
an error of statutory interpretation. Supra notes 314, 320-321. To the extent the argument is
that Section 2255(h)'s limitations repealed or limited the scope of the savings clause, implied
repeals of jurisdictional statutes are heavily disfavored, particularly when they raise
constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 565 U.S. 368, 749 (2012)
(citing Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002)).
3 Cf. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584-85 (10th Cir. 2011).
336 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3755(b)(2) (2012) ("other remed[ies] ... include ... relief under
an assignment of rents"); 22 U.S.C. § 1642(b) (2012) ("No judicial relief or remedy shall be
available..."); 22 U.S.C. § 1631(g)(i) (2012) ("The sole relief and remedy . . . shall be the
relief and remedy provided in this section."); 22 U.S.C. § 1631(f)(c) (2012) (similar); 22
U.S.C. § 4139 (2012) (describing "other remedies" as "relief under chapter 12"); 38 U.S.C.
§ 4323(d) (2012) (authorizing as "remedies" the court to "award relief as follows"); 42
U.S.C. § 299(b)-22(f)(4)(A) (2012) (describing "equitable relief' together with other
"remedies available"); 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(H) (2012) (describing "legal remedy" as
opposed to "injunctive relief' and then "injunctive relief' as a "necessary remedy").
337 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
338 Id.; See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004) (describing § 1303 as
"vesting district courts with jurisdiction over habeas writs from tribal courts").
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they are not permitted to do so under Section 2255(h), that would still
not address claims by legally innocent state prisoners.339
c. Extraordinary Writs
Another option would be to have the Supreme Court use a variety of
extraordinary writs to substitute for successive motions for post-
conviction review. The AEDPA prevents prisoners from appealing a
decision denying them authorization to file a successive petition for
post-conviction review, either by way of a petition for rehearing in the
court of appeals, or a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.340
Felker v. Turpin rejected a constitutional challenge to that provision, but
held that it did "not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to entertain
original habeas petitions."3 41  The statute conferring original habeas
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court does not contain any of the limitations
applicable to successive motions.34 2
The Supreme Court's own rules make clear that original writs are
rarely granted. "To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner must show exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise
of the Court's discretionary powers and must show that adequate relief
cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. These
writs are rarely granted." 34 3 In 2009, however, the Supreme Court
transferred a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus to a district
court to hear additional evidence of the petitioner's innocence. 3" A
concurrence explained why a claim of innocence warranted an exercise
of the Court's power to issue an extraordinary writ-"[t]he substantial
339 One court of appeals rejected this interpretation before Montgomery, reserving the
constitutional question. E.g., Prost, 636 F.3d at 591 (10th Cir. 2011). The other did so after
Montgomery, rejecting the argument that it would be unconstitutional to prevent a defendant
from filing a habeas petition to challenge a sentence above the lawful statutory maximum.
McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 2017). For
reasons explained supra and elsewhere, their reasoning is unpersuasive. See Litman,
Gorsuch, supra note 325.
340 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2012).
341 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996).
342 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (2012).
343 Felker, 518 U.S. at 665 (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(a)).
344 In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 (2009). After the district court heard additional
evidence, it found that the petitioner failed to prove his innocence. In re Davis, No. CV409-
130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010).
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risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate
justification .... Simply put, the case is sufficiently 'exceptional' to
warrant utilization of this Court's Rule [on original writs], and our
original habeas jurisdiction."3 45
There is some possibility that the Court could use original writs of
habeas corpus to grant relief to legally innocent prisoners. The statute
allowing prisoners to file original writs of habeas corpus extends to both
state and federal prisoners,3 46 and the Court could use original writs
either in cases where petitioners were convicted or sentenced under
statutes that have since been held unconstitutional, or where prisoners
were convicted or sentenced under statutes that have since been
interpreted not to apply to them. In cases where the petitioner's
conviction or sentence might remain valid under another provision, the
state or federal government could argue those points in the court to
whom jurisdiction was passed.
There are, however, serious limitations to the Court's ability to use
original writs as a mechanism to make post-conviction relief available to
legally innocent prisoners. The first is that many prisoners do not have
counsel when they ask the Supreme Court to hear their cases; their
petitions might not identify the relevant decision that invalidated or
interpreted the statute under which they were convicted or sentenced, or
even the statute under which the petitioner was convicted or sentenced.
The second is the sheer number of pro se petitions that are filed in the
Supreme Court. Each year the Court receives some 7-8,000 petitions for
a writ of certiorari.34 7 Were the Court to start granting petitions for
original writs of habeas corpus, there would likely be many such
petitions filed. The third may be a general reticence to resort to
extraordinary writs, which the Court's actions over the last several
decades evince.3 48
345 In re Davis, 557 U.S. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012).
347 Frequently Asked Questions, Supreme Court of the U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq ceneral.aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZBY-E9MR] (last
visited Dec. 9, 2016).
348 Lee Kovarsky surveyed the Court's original habeas jurisdiction and outlined how it
could and should be used. See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va. L. Rev. 61
(2011). But the Court has repeatedly ducked any reliance on, or resort to, its original habeas
jurisdiction, even when original habeas petitions present otherwise ideal vehicles to resolve
issues they want to and do resolve. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Supreme Court, Original
Habeas, And The Paradoxical Virtue of Obscurity, 97 Va. L. Rev. Online 31, 32-33 (2011)
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There may be ways to make the original writ process more open to
claims of legal innocence. Right now, the Supreme Court's guide for
prospective indigent petitioners does not require them to include any
information that will necessarily indicate whether the petitioner is
legally innocent. Because petitioners seeking to use original writs as a
substitute for successive motions will have, in many cases, already filed
at least one motion for post-conviction review in federal court, the guide
directs them to include only federal court opinions, and any state court
decision that is referenced in the federal court decision.3 49 It would be a
fairly easy addendum to ask petitioners to also identify the statute under
which they were convicted and sentenced, and any subsequent decision
(in either federal or state court) that has held that statute invalid, or
narrowed it such that it does not apply to them. There may still be many
cases where petitioners, unlearned in the law, do not do so, but
amending the form would at least point them in that direction.
B. Merits & Freestanding Claims
1. Cognizability
It is not yet clear whether factual innocence provides a freestanding
ground for habeas relief. The federal post-conviction statutes only
provide a remedy for persons who are in custody in violation of "the
Constitution or laws of the United States."3 50 Because the Court has not
yet recognized that it would violate the Constitution to convict, detain,
or perhaps even execute an individual who is factually innocent of the
crime they were convicted of, it remains unclear whether factual
innocence claims provide a cognizable ground for federal habeas
relief.35 1 Given the relationship between legal innocence and factual
innocence, that may suggest that legal innocence claims are not a
(using post-World War II war crimes petitions); Stephen I. Viadeck, Using The Supreme
Court's Original Habeas Jurisdiction To 'Ma[k]e' New Rules Retroactive, 28 Fed. Sent'g
Rep. 225 (2016) (using Johnson-related petitions).
349 Supreme Court Guide For In Forma Pauperis Cases, at 4, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforifpcases2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHW-
PWSS].
350 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a); 2255(a) (2012).
351 See Dist. Att'y's Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 (2009) (noting
"whether such a federal right [to be released upon proof of actual innocence] exists is an
open question") (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-417 (1993) and House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006)); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400-01.
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freestanding ground for habeas relief. If it is unresolved whether there is
such a thing as a freestanding factual innocence claim, then there may
not be a freestanding legal innocence claim either.
That being said, the grounds for habeas relief that are specified by the
federal habeas statutes pose less of a barrier to legally innocent
petitioners. If a petitioner is legally innocent because the statute under
which the petitioner was convicted or sentenced is unconstitutional, the
petitioner is necessarily raising a constitutional claim. For federal
prisoners who are legally innocent because the state law under which
they were convicted or sentenced has been interpreted not to apply to
them, their custody and detention is also in violation of the "laws of the
United States," which do not authorize the petitioner's custody or
detention.35 2
The more difficult case is for state prisoners who are legally innocent
because the state statute under which they were convicted or sentenced
has been interpreted not to apply to them. Those prisoners, superficially
at least, do not appear to have a constitutional claim that arises because
they are being imprisoned for an act that the state statute did not actually
make criminal.353 They may, however, obtain habeas relief on another
constitutional claim: because legal innocence functions as an exemption
to the many procedural doctrines that might otherwise preclude federal
habeas review, such as procedural default, a petitioner's legal innocence
would allow a claim to be heard on its merits even if the petitioner did
not previously raise that claim in state court. And a petitioner could
reframe a statutory legal innocence claim as a constitutional one, such as
a claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction
under the statute, properly interpreted; 35 4 or the claim that the jury did
not find all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt;355
352 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
353 For state prisoners, whether a decision of state statutory interpretation is retroactive
now turns on whether the decision reflected the meaning of the statute at the time of the
prisoner's conviction. If the decision clarified or merely interpreted the language of the
statute, the decision applies retroactively. Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 838, 840 (2003) (per
curiam); Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001) (per curiam). If the decision
"changed" the language of the statute, there are now only uncertain due process limits that
may require the retroactive application of some decisions. Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S.
351, 365-68 (2013); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 458-62 (2001).
354 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1979).
35s Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475-77 (2000) (Sixth Amendment requires
juries to find all elements of the offense); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (Fifth
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among others. And under the innocence exception to procedural default,
a prisoner could obtain review of that claim even if he did not previously
raise that claim in state court.
2. AEDPA Deference
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal courts may grant a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits
only if the state court's adjudication was "contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of' clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.3 56 Carey v. Musladin held that whether a decision is contrary
to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent is
determined with reference to holdings, not dicta of the Supreme
Court,357 and Greene v. Fisher held that the relevant Supreme Court
precedent is only whatever Supreme Court precedent existed at the time
of the state court's adjudication of the defendant's claim.35 8
The combination of Carey and Fisher could create a dilemma where a
state court has previously rejected the prisoner's legal innocence claim.
For example, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v.
Florida, there was no holding of the Supreme Court that said states
could never impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who were
convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 35 9 But once Graham held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited states from sentencing those juveniles to
life without parole, it created a class of legally innocent petitioners who
had received a sentence that the law could not impose on them. But
those legally innocent petitioners may not have been entitled to relief if
federal courts were only able to assess whether the state court's
adjudication of the petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim was reasonable
at the time of the state court's adjudication. At the time of the
adjudication-and indeed, at any time prior to Graham-there was no
Supreme Court holding (or even a suggestion in dicta) that juveniles
convicted of nonhomicide offenses were categorically precluded from
receiving a sentence of life without parole.
Amendment requires juries to find elements beyond a reasonable doubt and to be instructed
on reasonable doubt standard).
356 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
3.. 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).
358 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011).
39 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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Greene, however, contained a potential caveat. In a footnote, the
Court stated that "[w]hether 2254(d)(1) would bar a federal habeas
petitioner from relying on a decision that came after the last state-court
adjudication on the merits, but fell within one of the exceptions
recognized in Teague, is a question we need not address to resolve this
case."3 60 Because the first exception to Teague is where a petitioner was
convicted or sentenced under an unconstitutional statute (or received a
punishment the law cannot impose), Greene appears to contemplate that
the AEDPA would not limit federal courts' ability to review the merits
of those claims. The Greene footnote is interesting because there is
nothing in Section 2254(d)(1) itself that might suggest a carve-out for
legal innocence claims, or any particular kind of claim.3 6 1 Greene
reasoned that "the provision's 'backward-looking language requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made,"' to
measure them against the Court's contemporaneous precedent.362 But
Greene's seeming willingness to treat legal innocence claims differently
under a provision that makes little reference to the nature of the claim
that is being raised may suggest that legal innocence claims could and
would be treated differently under some of the other provisions, such as
successive motion or exhaustion provisions.
Even though Greene suggests the reasonableness of a state court's
adjudication of a legal innocence claim might be measured with
reference to current Supreme Court precedent, rather than that which
existed at the time of the state court's adjudication, it did not explicitly
suggest anything about whether federal courts should ask only whether it
was reasonable for a state court to reject the petitioner's claim. That is,
should a federal court ask whether the best reading of current Supreme
Court precedent is that the petitioner is legally innocent, or whether it
would have been reasonable to conclude that the petitioner was not
legally innocent (taking into account all potentially relevant Supreme
Court precedent)? For example, before the Court announced in Miller v.
Alabama that most juveniles convicted of homicide could also not be
sentenced to life without parole, it may have been a reasonable reading
360 Greene, 565 U.S. at 39 n*.
361 Section 2254(d)(1) refers to "the adjudication of the clain" that "resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law."
362 Greene. 565 U.S. at 38.
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of Graham that the decision did not prohibit imposing sentences of life
without parole on juveniles convicted of homicide. But what if a federal
court was convinced the best reading of Graham was that the decision
did foreclose states' ability to sentence almost all juveniles to life
without parole? The Greene footnote does not suggest that federal courts
are freed from the statutory directive to assess whether a denial of a
claim is reasonable, but its logic, which is predicated on the nature of the
petitioner's claim, does. But it suggested that Section 2254(d)(1) allows
courts to treat legal innocence claims differently for purposes of
deciding what Supreme Court precedent counts under Section
2254(d)(1) because of the nature of legal innocence claims.3 63 Greene
therefore might indicate some willingness to allow federal courts to treat
legal innocence claims differently when deciding whether Section
2254(d)(1) requires only a very limited reasonableness review of a
petitioner's legal innocence claim.
CONCLUSION
Calls for innocence to matter in federal habeas have overlooked an
emerging category of innocence-cases where a defendant is legally
innocent of his offense or sentence because he was convicted or
sentenced under a statute that is unconstitutional, or that does not apply
to him. The Court has increasingly begun to recognize and treat these
cases as cases of innocence, and grounded its concern for these cases in
innocence-related considerations. These kinds of legal innocence are
conceptually and inextricably linked with factual innocence cases, where
new evidence shows the defendant did not commit the act for which he
was convicted. In both sets of cases, the defendant was convicted or
sentenced of something the law does not criminalize. Recognizing the
emerging category of legal innocence as a kind of innocence makes it
possible for the existing federal habeas system to provide relief to
legally innocent defendants rather than hoping for a future Congress to
make clear that federal habeas review should be available in those cases.
363 Montgomery also bolsters this reading. 136 S. Ct. at 718. See supra Subsection III.A.5.
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